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### Links

#### The central question of this debate is whose politics best creates a radical break with capitalism—the 1AC’s focus on the targeting of the black body reduces capitalism to just one of a set of antagonisms and causes endless subdivision of political demands which dangerously distracts from revolutionary politics proper—this round is a question of starting points—the perm can never be truly radical because the 1AC’s particular focus has always already ceded the universal

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If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics. The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems. They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on. The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences. (Žižek 1999: 218) The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing. ‘Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level. Two fatal consequences follow from this. Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits. Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, is not a simple epistemological progress but part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety. (Žižek 2000a: 106) The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough. The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests (Žižek 2000a: 108). The right to narrate, which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate (Žižek 2002b: 177). Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? ‘Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

#### The aff is wasted energy – fighting particular battles without changing the way the economy works means nothing really changes – the aff just obscures the logic of capitalism

**Zizek, ’99** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

The big news of today’s post-political age of the ‘end of ideology’ is thus the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy: the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made. In short, the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom, the subordinated of the process of production to social control – the radical repoliticization of the economy. That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s post-politics cannot attain the properly political dimension of universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization. The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues (gay rights, ecology, ethnic minorities…), all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building multiple ad hoc coalitions, and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what really matters – will *not* be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized. 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, it is much more crucial to focus on what remains the same in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital. The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### Basing politics on the gratuitous violence of racism usurps understanding of political economy—this legitimizes neoliberal ideology and mystifies class antagonism

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In both films the bogus happy endings are possible only because they characterize their respective regimes of racial hierarchy in the superficial terms of interpersonal transactions. In *The Help* segregationism’s evil was small-minded bigotry and lack of sensitivity; it was more like bad manners than oppression. In Tarantino’s vision, slavery’s definitive injustice was its **gratuitous** and sadistic brutalization and sexualized degradation. Malevolent, ludicrously arrogant whites owned slaves most conspicuously to degrade and torture them. Apart from serving a formal dinner in a plantation house—and Tarantino, the Chance the Gardener of American filmmakers (and Best Original Screenplay? Really?) seems to draw his images of plantation life from Birth of a Nation and Gone With the Wind, as well as old Warner Brothers cartoons—and the Mandingo fighters and comfort girls, Tarantino’s slaves do no actual work at all; they’re present only to be brutalized. In fact, the cavalier sadism with which owners and traders treat them belies the fact that slaves were, **first and foremost, capital investments.** It’s not for nothing that New Orleans has a monument to the estimated 20,000-30,000 antebellum Irish immigrants who died constructing the New Basin Canal; slave labor was **too valuable** for such lethal work.

*The Help* trivializes Jim Crow by reducing it to its most superficial features and irrational extremes. The master-servant nexus was, and is, a labor relation. And the problem of labor relations particular to the segregationist regime wasn’t employers’ bigoted lack of respect or failure to hear the voices of the domestic servants, or even benighted refusal to recognize their equal humanity. It was that the labor relation was structured within and sustained by a political and institutional order that severely impinged on, when it didn’t altogether deny, black citizens’ avenues for pursuit of grievances and standing before the law. The crucial lynchpin of that order was neither myopia nor malevolence; it was suppression of black citizens’ capacities for direct participation in civic and political life, with racial disfranchisement and the constant threat of terror intrinsic to substantive denial of equal protection and due process before the law as its principal mechanisms. And the point of the regime wasn’t racial hatred or enforced disregard; its roots lay in the **much more prosaic concern** of dominant elites to maintain their political and economic hegemony by suppressing potential opposition and in the linked ideal of maintaining access to a labor force with no options but to accept employment on whatever terms employers offered. (Those who liked *The Help* or found it moving should watch *The Long Walk Home*, a 1990 film set in Montgomery, Alabama, around the bus boycott. I suspect that’s the film you thought you were watching when you saw The Help.)

*Django Unchained* trivializes slavery by reducing it to its most barbaric and lurid excesses. Slavery also was fundamentally a labor relation. It was a form of forced labor regulated—systematized, enforced and sustained—through a political and institutional order that specified it as a civil relationship granting owners absolute control over the life, liberty, and fortunes of others defined as eligible for enslavement, including most of all control of the conditions of their labor and appropriation of its product. Historian Kenneth M. Stampp quotes a slaveholder’s succinct explanation: “‘For what purpose does the master hold the servant?’ asked an ante-bellum Southerner. ‘Is it not that by his labor, he, the master, may accumulate wealth?’”1

That absolute control permitted horrible, unthinkable brutality, to be sure, **but perpetrating such brutality was neither the point of slavery nor its essential injustice**. The master-slave relationship could, and did, exist without brutality, and certainly without sadism and sexual degradation. In Tarantino’s depiction, however, it is not clear that slavery shorn of its extremes of brutality would be objectionable. It does not diminish the historical injustice and horror of slavery to note that it was **not the product of *sui generis*, transcendent Evil but a terminus on a continuum of bound labor** that was more norm than exception in the Anglo-American world until well into the eighteenth century, if not later. As legal historian Robert Steinfeld points out, it is not so much slavery, but the emergence of the notion of free labor—as the absolute control of a worker over her person—that is the historical anomaly that needs to be explained.2 *Django Unchained* sanitizes the essential injustice of slavery by not problematizing it and by **focusing instead** on the extremes of brutality and degradation it permitted, to the extent of making some of them up, just as does *The Help* regarding Jim Crow.

*The Help* could not imagine a more honest and complex view of segregationist Mississippi partly because it uses the period ultimately as a prop for human interest cliché, and *Django Unchained*’s absurdly ahistorical view of plantation slavery is only backdrop for the merger of spaghetti western and blaxploitation hero movie. Neither film is really about the period in which it is set. Film critic Manohla Dargis, reflecting a decade ago on what she saw as a growing Hollywood penchant for period films, observed that such films are typically “stripped of politics and historical fact…and instead will find meaning in appealing to seemingly timeless ideals and stirring scenes of love, valor and compassion” and that “the Hollywood professionals who embrace accuracy most enthusiastically nowadays are costume designers.”3 That observation applies to both these films, although in *Django* concern with historically accurate representation of material culture applies only to the costumes and props of the 1970s film genres Tarantino wants to recall.

To make sense of how *Django Unchained* has received so much warmer a reception among black and leftoid commentators than did *The Help*, it is useful to recall Margaret Thatcher’s 1981 dictum that “economics are the method: the object is to change the soul.”4 Simply put, she and her element have won. Few observers—among opponents and boosters alike—have noted how deeply and thoroughly both films are embedded in the practical ontology of neoliberalism, the complex of unarticulated assumptions and unexamined first premises that provide its common sense, its lifeworld.

Objection to *The Help* has been largely of the shooting fish in a barrel variety: complaints about the film’s paternalistic treatment of the maids, which generally have boiled down to an objection that the master-servant relation is thematized at all, as well as the standard, predictable litany of anti-racist charges about whites speaking for blacks, the film’s inattentiveness to the fact that at that time in Mississippi black people were busily engaged in liberating themselves, etc. An illustration of this tendency that conveniently refers to several other variants of it is Akiba Solomon, “Why I’m Just Saying No to ‘The Help’ and Its Historical Whitewash” in Color Lines,August 10, 2011, available at:http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/08/why\_im\_just\_saying\_no\_to\_the\_help.html.

Defenses of *Django Unchained* pivot on claims about the social significance of the narrative of a black hero. One node of this argument emphasizes the need to validate a history of autonomous black agency and “resistance” as a politico-existential desideratum. It accommodates a view that stresses the importance of recognition of rebellious or militant individuals and revolts in black American history. Another centers on a notion that exposure to fictional black heroes can inculcate the sense of personal efficacy necessary to overcome the psychological effects of inequality and to facilitate upward mobility and may undermine some whites’ negative stereotypes about black people. In either register assignment of social or political importance to depictions of black heroes rests on presumptions about the nexus of mass cultural representation, social commentary, and racial justice that are more significant politically than the controversy about the film itself. In both versions, this argument casts political and **economic problems in psychological terms**. Injustice appears as a matter of disrespect and denial of due recognition, and the remedies proposed—which are all about images projected and the distribution of jobs associated with their projection—look a lot like self-esteem engineering. Moreover, nothing could indicate more strikingly the extent of neoliberal ideological hegemonythan the idea that the mass culture industry and its representational practices constitute a **meaningful terrain for struggle** to advance egalitarian interests. It is possible to entertain that view seriously only by ignoring the fact that the production and consumption of mass culture is thoroughly embedded in capitalist material and ideological imperatives.

That, incidentally, is why I prefer the usage “mass culture” to describe this industry and its products and processes, although I recognize that it may seem archaic to some readers. The mass culture v. popular culture debate dates at least from the 1950s and has continued with occasional crescendos ever since.5 For two decades or more, instructively in line with the retreat of possibilities for concerted left political action outside the academy, the popular culture side of that debate has been dominant, along with its view that the products of this precinct of mass consumption capitalism are somehow capable of transcending or subverting their material identity as commodities, if not avoiding that identity altogether. Despite the dogged commitment of several generations of American Studies and cultural studies graduate students who want to valorize watching television and immersion in hip-hop or other specialty market niches centered on youth recreation and the most ephemeral fads as both intellectually avant-garde and politically “resistive,” it should be time to admit that that earnest disposition is **intellectually shallow and an ersatz politics**. The idea of “popular” culture posits a spurious autonomy and organicism that actually affirm mass industrial processes by effacing them, especially in the putatively rebel, fringe, or underground market niches that **depend on the fiction of the authentic** to announce the birth of new product cycles.

The power of the hero is a cathartic trope that connects mainly with the sensibility of adolescent boys—of whatever nominal age. Tarantino has allowed as much, responding to black critics’ complaints about the violence and copious use of “nigger” by proclaiming “Even for the film’s biggest detractors, I think their children will grow up and love this movie. I think it could become a rite of passage for young black males.”6 This response stems no doubt from Tarantino’s arrogance and opportunism, and some critics have denounced it as no better than racially presumptuous. But he is hardly alone in defending the film with an assertion that it gives black youth heroes, is generically inspirational or both. Similarly, in a January 9, 2012 interview on the Daily Show, George Lucas adduced this line to promote his even more execrable race-oriented live-action cartoon, *Red Tails*, which, incidentally, trivializes segregation in the military by reducing it to a matter of bad or outmoded attitudes. The ironic effect is significant understatement of both the obstacles the Tuskegee airmen faced and their actual accomplishments by rendering them as backdrop for a blackface, slapped-together remake of *Top Gun*. (Norman Jewison’s 1984 film, *A Soldier’s Story*, adapted from Charles Fuller’s *A Soldier’s Play*, is a much more sensitive and thought-provoking rumination on the complexities of race and racism in the Jim Crow U.S. Army—an army mobilized, as my father, a veteran of the Normandy invasion, never tired of remarking sardonically, to fight the racist Nazis.) Lucas characterized his film as “patriotic, even jingoistic” and was explicit that he wanted to create a film that would feature “real heroes” and would be “inspirational for teenage boys.” Much as *Django Unchained*’s defenders compare it on those terms favorably to *Lincoln*, Lucas hyped *Red Tails* as being a genuine hero story unlike “*Glory*, where you have a lot of white officers running those guys into cannon fodder.”

Of course, the film industry is sharply tilted toward the youth market, as Lucas and Tarantino are acutely aware. But Lucas, unlike Tarantino, was not being defensive in asserting his desire to inspire the young; he offered it more as a boast. As he has said often, he’d wanted for years to make a film about the Tuskegee airmen, and he reports that he always intended telling their story as a feel-good, crossover inspirational tale. Telling it that way also fits in principle (though in this instance not in practice, as *Red Tails* bombed at the box office) with the commercial imperatives of increasingly degraded mass entertainment. Dargis observed that the ahistoricism of the recent period films is influenced by market imperatives in a global film industry. The more a film is tied to historically specific contexts, the more difficult it is to sell elsewhere. That logic selects for special effects-driven products as well as standardized, decontextualized and simplistic—“universal”—story lines, preferably set in fantasy worlds of the filmmakers’ design. As Dargis notes, these films find their meaning in shopworn clichés puffed up as timeless verities, including uplifting and inspirational messages for youth. But something else underlies the stress on inspiration in the black-interest films, which shows up in critical discussion of them as well.

All these films—*The Help, Red Tails, Django Unchained*, even *Lincoln* and *Glory*—make a claim to public attention based partly on their social significance beyond entertainment or art, and they do so because they engage with significant moments in the history of the nexus of race and politics in the United States. There would not be so much discussion and debate and no Golden Globe, NAACP Image, or Academy Award nominations for *The Help*, *Red Tails*, or *Django Unchained* if those films weren’t defined partly by thematizing that nexus of race and politics in some way.

The pretensions to social significance that fit these films into their particular market niche don’t conflict with the mass-market film industry’s imperative of infantilization because those pretensions are only part of the show; they are little more than empty bromides, product differentiation in the patter of “seemingly timeless ideals” which the mass entertainment industry constantly recycles. (Andrew O’Hehir observes as much about *Django Unchained*, which he describes as “a three-hour trailer for a movie that never happens.”7) That comes through in the defense of these films, in the face of evidence of their failings, that, after all, they are “just entertainment.” Their substantive content is ideological; it is their contribution to the naturalization of neoliberalism’s ontology as they propagandize its universalization across spatial, temporal, and social contexts.

Purportedly in the interest of popular education cum entertainment, *Django Unchained* and *The Help*, and *Red Tails* for that matter, read the sensibilities of the present into the past by divesting the latter of its specific historicity. They reinforce the sense of the past as generic old-timey times distinguishable from the present by superficial inadequacies—outmoded fashion, technology, commodities and ideas—since overcome. In *The Help* Hilly’s obsession with her pet project marks segregation’s petty apartheid as irrational in part because of the expense rigorously enforcing it would require; the breadwinning husbands express their frustration with it as financially impractical. Hilly is a mean-spirited, narrow-minded person whose rigid and tone-deaf commitment to segregationist consistency not only reflects her limitations of character but also is economically unsound, a fact that further defines her, and the cartoon version of Jim Crow she represents, as irrational.

The deeper message of these films, insofar as they deny the integrity of the past, is that there is **no thinkable alternative to the ideological order under which we live**. This message is reproduced throughout the mass entertainment industry; it shapes the normative reality even of the fantasy worlds that masquerade as escapism. Even among those who laud the supposedly cathartic effects of Django’s insurgent violence as reflecting a greater truth of abolition than passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, few commentators notice that he and Broomhilda attained their freedom through a market transaction.8 This reflects an ideological hegemony in which students all too commonly wonder why planters would deny slaves or sharecroppers education because education would have made them more productive as workers. And, tellingly, in a glowing rumination in the Daily Kos, Ryan Brooke inadvertently thrusts mass culture’s destruction of historicity into bold relief by declaiming on “the segregated society presented” in *Django Unchained* and babbling on—with the absurdly ill-informed and pontifical self-righteousness that the blogosphere enables—about our need to take “responsibility for preserving racial divides” if we are “to put segregation in the past and fully fulfill Dr. King’s dream.”9 It’s all an indistinguishable mush of bad stuff about racial injustice in the old-timey days. Decoupled from its moorings in a historically specific political economy, slavery becomes at bottom a problem of race relations, and, as historian Michael R. West argues forcefully, “race relations” emerged as and has remained a discourse that substitutes etiquette for equality.10

This is the context in which we should take account of what “inspiring the young” means as a justification for those films. In part, the claim to inspire is a simple platitude, more filler than substance. It is, as I’ve already noted, both an excuse for films that are cartoons made for an infantilized, generic market and an assertion of a claim to a particular niche within that market. More insidiously, though, the ease with which “inspiration of youth” rolls out in this context resonates with three related and disturbing themes: 1) underclass ideology’s narratives—now all Americans’ common sense—that link poverty and inequality most crucially to (racialized) cultural inadequacy and psychological damage; 2) the belief that racial inequality stems from prejudice, bad ideas and ignorance, and 3) the cognate of both: the neoliberal rendering of social justice as equality of opportunity, with an aspiration of creating “competitive individual minority agents who might stand **a better fighting chance in the neoliberal rat race rather than a positive alternative vision of a society that eliminates the need to fight constantly against disruptive market whims** in the first place.”11

This politics seeps through in the chatter about *Django Unchained* in particular. Erin Aubry Kaplan, in the Los Angeles Times article in which Tarantino asserts his appeal to youth, remarks that the “most disturbing detail [about slavery] is the emotional violence and degradation directed at blacks that effectively keeps them at the bottom of the social order, a place they still occupy today.” Writing on the Institute of the Black World blog, one Dr. Kwa David Whitaker, a 1960s-style cultural nationalist, declaims on Django’s testament to the sources of degradation and “unending servitude [that] has rendered [black Americans] almost incapable of making sound evaluations of our current situations or the kind of steps we must take to improve our condition.”12 In its blindness to political economy, this notion of black cultural or psychological damage as either a legacy of slavery or of more indirect recent origin—e.g., urban migration, crack epidemic, matriarchy, babies making babies—comports well with the reduction of slavery and Jim Crow to interpersonal dynamics and bad attitudes. It **substitutes a “politics of recognition”** and a patter of racial uplift for politics and underwrites a conflation of political action and therapy.

With respect to the nexus of race and inequality, this discourse supports victim-blaming programs of personal rehabilitation and self-esteem engineering—inspiration—as easily as it does multiculturalist respect for difference, which, by the way, also feeds back to self-esteem engineering and inspiration as nodes within a larger political economy of race relations**.** Either way, this is a discourse that **displaces a politics** **challenging social structures that reproduce inequality** with concern for the feelings and characteristics of individuals and of categories of population statistics reified as singular groups that are equivalent to individuals. This discourse has made it possible (again, but more sanctimoniously this time) to characterize destruction of low-income housing as an uplift strategy for poor people; curtailment of access to public education as “choice”; being cut adrift from essential social wage protections as “empowerment”; and individual material success as socially important role modeling**.**

Neoliberalism’s triumph is affirmed with unselfconscious clarity in the ostensibly leftist defenses of *Django Unchained* that center on the theme of slaves’ having liberated themselves. Trotskyists, would-be anarchists, and psychobabbling identitarians have their respective sectarian garnishes: Trotskyists see everywhere the bugbear of “bureaucratism” and mystify “self-activity;” anarchists similarly fetishize direct action and voluntarism and oppose large-scale public institutions on principle, and identitarians romanticize essentialist notions of organic, folkish authenticity under constant threat from institutions. However, **all are indistinguishable from the nominally libertarian right in their disdain for government and institutionally based political action, which their common reflex is to disparage as inauthentic or corrupt.**

#### The 1AC’s impossible demand for the “end of the world” maintains the status quo—we can passionately play the role of radicals without risking actual change. They are not the revolutionary change that they imply they are

Zizek 2(Slavoj**,** International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis,  *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates*, “Passions of the Real, Passions of Semblance”, p. 59-61)

In a strict Lacanian sense of the term, we should thus posit that 'happiness' relies on the subject's inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desire. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we 'officially' desire. Happiness is thus inherently hypocritical: it is the happiness of dreaming about things we do not really want. When today's Left bombards the capitalist system with demands that it obviously cannot fulfil (Full employment! Retain the welfare state! Full rights for immigrants!), it is basically playing a game of hysterical provocation, of addressing the Master with a demand which will be impossible for him to meet, and will thus expose his impotence. The problem with this strategy, however, is not only that the system cannot meet these demands, but that, in addition, those who voice them do not really want them to be realized. For example when, 'radical' academics demand full rights for immigrants and opening of the borders, are they aware that the direct implementation of this demand would, for obvious reasons, inundate developed Western countries with millions of newcomers, thus provoking a violent working-class racist backlash which would then endanger the privileged position ofthese very academics? Of course they are, but they count on the fact that their demand will not be met - in this way, they can hypocritically retain their clear radical conscience while continuing to enjoy their privileged position. In 1994, when a new wave of emigration from Cuba to the USA was on the cards, Fidel Castro warned the USA that if they did not stop inciting Cubans to emigrate, Cuba would no longer prevent them from doing it - which the Cuban authorities in effect did a couple of days later, embarrassing the USA with thousands of unwanted newcomers.... Is this not like the proverbial woman who snapped back at a man who was making macho advances to her: 'Shut up, or you'll have to do what you're boasting about!' In both cases, the gesture is that of calling the other's bluff, counting on the fact that what the other really fears is that one will fully comply with his or her demand. And would not the same gesture also throw our radical academics into a panic? Here the old '68 motto 'Soy0ns realistes, demandons l'impossible!' acquires a new cynical and sinister meaning which, perhaps, reveals its truth: 'Let's be realists: we, the academic Left, want to appear critical, while fully enjoying the privileges the system offers us. So let's bombard the system with impossible demands: we all know that these demands won't be met, so we can be sure that nothing will actually change, and we'll maintain our privileged status!' If someone accuses a big corporation of particular financial crimes, he or she is exposed to risks which can go right up to murder attempts; if he or she asks the same corporation to finance a research project into the link between global capitalism and the emergence of hybrid postcolonial identities, he or she stands a good chance of getting hundreds ofthousands of dollars.

### Impact

#### You should reject the 1AC’s call to be an anti-ethical decisionmaker. Resisting this reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility

**Zizek and Daly** 20**04**

(Slavoj, professor of philosophy at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, and Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, Conversations with Zizek, page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### This is not a meaningless question – the structures of capitalism are driving multiple large-scale processes that are increasingly out of the control of individuals living their lives. Global warming, multiple wars of accumulation, loss of land and income stratification: all of these are making life unlivable.

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 145-147)

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3

The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now.

We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven.

For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.

In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

#### Modern Racism is no longer based on ideologies of cultural or natural superiority - economic egotism is the root of modern racism

Zizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 101-104

But we are not dealing here only with good old racism. Something more is at stake: a fundamental feature of our emerging “global” society. On ii September 2001 the Twin Towers were hit. Twelve years earlier, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. That date heralded the “happy ‘9os,” the Francis Fukuyama dream of the “end of history” —the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won; that the search was over; that the advent of a global, liberal world community lurked just around the corner; that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time was up). In contrast, 9/11 is the main symbol of the end of the Clintonite happy ‘9os. This is the era in which new walls emerge everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, on the U.S.—Mexico border. The rise of the populist New Right is just the most prominent example of the urge to raise new walls. A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the European Union passed almost unnoticed: the plan to establish an all-European border police force to secure the isolation of Union territory and thus to prevent the influx of immigrants. *This* is the truth of globalisation: the construction of new walls safeguarding prosperous Europe from the immigrant flood. One is tempted to resuscitate here the old Marxist “humanist” opposition of “relations between things” and “relations between persons”: in the much-celebrated free circulation opened up by global capitalism, it is “things” (commodities) which freely circulate, while the circulation of “persons” is more and more controlled. We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an unfinished project but with a true “dialectics of globalisation”: the segregation of the people *is* the reality of economic globalisation. This new racism of the developed is in a way much more brutal than the previous ones: its implicit legitimisation is neither naturalist (the “natural” superiority of the developed West) nor any longer culturalist (we in the West also want to preserve our cultural identity), but unabashed economic egotism. The fundamental divide is one between those included in the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it.

#### The claim that race produced slavery is an empirical one—thus you should judge the evidence for it based on historical fact, not abstract theory. Most aff evidence is solely conclusionary—consensus goes neg

Drescher 97 [Seymour, Department of History, University of Pittsburgh; Slavery & Abolition, 18: 3, 212 — 227]

Perhaps the best point of departure is the collective volume that emerged from the fortieth anniversary conference on Capitalism and Slavery, held at Bellagio, Italy, and was published in 1987. The editors, Barbara L. Solow and Stanley L. Engerirían, divided the non-biographical contributions into three parts, corresponding to three major hypotheses on the relationship between economic development and slavery in the British empire. We may appropriately test the first hypothesis most briefly. Williams only briefly broached the subject and his assessment has not been of major historiographical interest in the subsequent literature. Williams took the position that economic factors rather than racism occupied pride of place in the switch to African labour in the plantation Americas, that slavery 'was not born of racism' but rather slavery led to racism. Although some recent interpretations make racial preferences and inhibitions central to the choice of African labour, Williams's order of priorities, if not his either-or approach, is supported by a survey of hundreds of articles. They **show virtual unanimity** on the primacy of economics in accounting for the turn toward slave labour. Non-economic factors, such as race or religion, entered into the development of New World slavery only as a limiting parameter. Such factors affected the historical sequence by which entire human groups (Christians, Jews, Muslim North Africans, Native Americans) were excluded from liability to enslavement in the Atlantic system. Since Williams published his book, the main change in the historiographical context of origins is an increase in the number and variety of actors brought into the process. That broader context complicates the role of any exclusively 'African' racial component of the slave trade. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, slavery, even the English colonial varieties, was hardly synonymous with Africans. Nor were Africans synonymous with slaves. In the African sector of the Atlantic system Europeans were forced to regard Africans (and Afro-Europeans) as autonomous and even locally dominant participants in the slave trade. They were often dominant militarily and were certainly dominant in terms of their massive presence and limited vulnerability to local diseases. Even in the Americas, Africans did not arrive only as captives and deracinated slaves.

#### The aff is a fundamental misreading of history

Darder, and Torress, 04 [Antonia, Prof of education policy studies at U of Illinois, and Rodolfo, Associate prof of latino studies at UC Irvine, After Race:  Racism after multiculturalism, p.6-8]

Although today “race” is generally linked to phenotypic characteris tics, there is a strong consensus among evolutionary biologists and ge netic anthropologists that “biologically identifiable human races do not exist; Homo sapiens constitute a single species, and have been so since their evolution in Africa and throughout their migration around the world” (Lee, Mountain, and Koenig 2001, 39). This perspective is simi lar to that which existed prior to the eighteenth century, when the notion that there were distinct populations whose differences were grounded in biology did not exist. For the Greeks, for example, the term “barbarian” was tied to how civilized a people were considered to be (generally based on language rather than genetics). So how did all this begin? George Fredrickson (2002), writing on the history of racism, identifies the anticipatory moment of modern racism with the “treatment of Jew ish converts to Christianity in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain. Conversos were identified and discriminated against because of the belief held by Christians that the impurity of their blood made them incapable of experiencing a true conversion” (31). Fredrickson argues that the racism inherent in the quasi-religious, Spanish doctrine of limpeza de sangre, referring to purity of blood, set the stage for the spread of racism to the New World: To the extent that it was enforced represented the stigmatization of an entire ethnic group on the basis of deficiencies that allegedly could not be eradicated by conversion or assimilation. Inherited social status was nothing new; the concept of “noble blood” had long meant that the off spring of certain families were born with a claim to high status. But when the status of large numbers of people was depressed purely and simply because of their derivation from a denigrated ethnos, a line had been crossed that gave “race” a new and more comprehensive significance. (33) Hence, religious notions, steeped in an ideology of “race,” played a significant role in the exportation of racism into the Americas, wheiie domination by the superior “race” was perceived as “inevitable and de sirable, because it was thought to lead to human progress” (Castles 1996, 21). The emergence of “race” as ideology can also be traced to the rise of nationalism. Efforts by nation-states to extend or deny rights of citizenship contingent on “race” or “ethnicity” were not uncommon, even within so-called democratic republics. Here, national mythology about those with “the biological unfitness for full citizenship” (Fredrickson 2002, 68) served to sanction exclusionary practices, despite the fact that all people shared “the historical process of migration and intermingling” (Castles 1996, 21). Herein is contained the logic behind what Valle and Torres (2000) term “the policing of race,” a condition that results in official policies and practices by the nation-state designed to exclude or curtail the rights of racialized populations. In Germany, the Nazi regime took the logic of “race” to its pinnacle, rendering Jewish and Gypsy pop ulations a threat to the state, thus rationalizing and justifying their demise. This example disrupts the notion that racism occurs only within the context of black-white relations. Instead, Castles (1996) argues that economic exploitation has always been central to the emergence of racism. Whether it incorporated slavery or indentured servitude, racial ized systems of labor were perpetrated in Europe against inunigrants, in cluding Irish, Jewish, and Polish workers, as well as against indigenous populations around the world. In the midst of the “scientific” penchant of the eighteenth century, Carolus Linneaus developed one of the first topologies to actually cate gorize human beings into four distinct subspecies: americanus, asiaticus, africanus, and europeaeus. Linneaus’s classification, allegedly neutral and scientific, included not only physical features but also behavioral charac teristics, hierarchically arranged in accordance with the prevailing social values and the political-economic interests of the times. The predictable result is the current ideological configuration of “race”. used to both ex plain and control social behavior. Etienne Balibar’s (2003) work on racism is useful in understanding the ideological justifications that historically have accompanied the exclu sion and domination of racialized populations—a phenomenon heavily fueled by the tensions of internal migration in the Current era of global ization. [R]acism describes in an abstract idealizing manner “types of human ity,” and. . . makes extensive use of classifications which allow all indi viduals and groups to imagine answers for the most immediate existen tial questions, such as imposition of identities and the permanence of vi olence between nations, ethnic or religious communities. (3) Balibar also points to the impact of “symbolic projections and media tions” (in particula; stereotypes and prejudices linked to divine-human ity or bestial-animality) in the construction of racialized formations. “Racial” classification becomes associated with a distinction between the “properly human” and its imaginary (animal-like) “other.” Such projec tions and mediations, Balibar argues, are inscribed with modernity’s ex pansionist rationality—a quasi-humanist conception that suggests that differences and inequalities are the result of unequal access and social ex clusion from cultural, political, or intellectual life but also implies that these differences and inequalities represent normal patterns, given the level of “humanity” or “animality” attributed to particular populations. James Baldwin in “A Talk to Teachers” (1988) links this phenomenon of racialization to the political economy and its impact on African Ameri cans.The point of all this is that Black men were brought here as a source of cheap labor. They were indispensable to the economy. In order to justify the fact that men were treated as though they were animals, the white re public had to brain wash itself into believing that they were indeed ani mals and deserved to be treated like animals. (7) Lee, Mountain, and Koenig (2001) note, “the taxonomy of race has al ways been and continues to be primarily political” (43). Since politics and economics actually constitute one sphere, it is more precise to say that the ideology of “race” continues to be primarily about political economy. Thus, historians of “race” and racism argue that the idea of immutable, biologically determined “races” is a direct outcome of exploration and colonialism, which furnished the “scientific” justification for the eco nomic exploitation, slavery, and even genocide of those groups perceived as subhuman.

#### Modern anti-blackness was born out of class based discrimination

Walsh and Jordan 8

White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America

Don Jordan is a television producer and director who has worked on dozens of documentaries and dramas. He also co-produced and co-wrote Love is the Devil, a film about the life of Francis Bacon.

Michael Walsh spent twelve years as a reporter and presenter on World in Action and has won six awards for his work. He is now a producer, specialising in political and historical documentaries.

While the Spanish slaughtered in America for gold, the English in  
America had to plant for their wealth. Failing to find the expcctcd  
mineral riches along the eastern seaboard, they turned to farming,  
hoping to make gold from tobacco. They needed a compliant,  
subservient, preferably free labour force and since the indigenous  
peoples of America were difficult to enslave they turned to their  
own homeland to provide. They imported Britons deemed to be  
'surplus' people - the rootless, the unemployed, the criminal and  
the dissident - and held them in the Americas in various forms of  
bondage for anything from three years to life.

This book tells the story of these victims of empire. They were  
all supposed to gain their freedom eventually. For many, it didn't  
work out that way. In the early decades, half of them died in  
bondage. This book tracks the evolution of the system in which  
tens of thousands of whites were held as chattels, marketed like  
cattle, punished brutally and in some cases literally worked to death.  
For decades, **this underclass was treated just as savagely as black**

**slaves and**, indeed, toiled, **suffered and rebelled alongside them.**  
Eventually, a racial wedge was thrust between white and black,  
leaving blacks officially enslaved and whites apparently upgraded  
but in reality just as enslaved as they were before. According to  
contemporaries, some whites were treated with less humanity than  
the blacks working alongside them.

Among the first to be sent were children. Some were dispatched  
by impoverished parents seeking a better life for them. But others  
were forcibly deported. In 1618, the authorities in London began  
to sweep up hundreds of troublesome urchins from the slums and,  
ignoring protests from the children and their families, shipped them  
to Virginia.1 England's richest man was behind this mass expulsion.  
It was presented as an act of charity': the 'starving children' were to

be given a new start as apprentices in America. In fact, they were  
sold to planters to work in the fields and half of them were dead  
within a year. Shipments of children continued from England and  
then from Ireland for decades. Many of these migrants were little  
more than toddlers. In 1661, the wife of a man who imported four  
"Irish boys' into Maryland as servants wondered why her husband  
had not brought 'some cradles to have rocked them in' as they  
were 'so little'.

A second group of forced migrants from the mother country  
were those, such as vagrants and petty criminals, whom England's  
rulers wished to be rid of. The legal ground was prepared for  
their relocation by a highwayman turned Lord Chief Justice who  
argued for England's gaols to be emptied in America. Thanks to  
men like him, 50,000 to 70,000 convicts (or maybe more) were  
transported to Virginia, Maryland, Barbados and England's other  
American possessions before 1776. All manner of others considered  
undesirable by the British Crown were also dispatched across the  
Atlantic to be sold into servitude. They ranged from beggars to  
prostitutes, Quakers to Cavaliers.2

A third group were the Irish. For centuries, Ireland had been  
something of a special case in English colonial history. From the  
Anglo-Normans onwards, the Irish were dehumanised, described  
as savages, so making their murder and displacement appear all the  
more justified. The colonisation of Ireland provided experience and  
drive for experiments further afield, not to mention large numbers  
of workers, coerced, transported or persuaded. Under Oliver  
Cromwell's ethnic-cleansing policy in Ireland, unknown numbers  
of Catholic men, women and children were forcibly transported  
to the colonics. And it did not end with Cromwell; for at least  
another hundred years, forced transportation continued as a fact  
of life in Ireland.

The other unwilling participants in the colonial labour force were  
the kidnapped. Astounding numbers are reported to have been  
snatched from the streets and countryside by gangs of kidnappers  
or 'spirits' working to satisfy the colonial hunger for labour. Based  
at every sizeable port in the British Isles, spirits conned or cocrccd  
the unwary onto ships bound for America. London's most active

kidnap gang discusscd their targets at a daily meeting in St Paul's  
Cathedral. They were reportedly paid £2 by planters' agents for  
every athletic-looking young man they brought aboard. According  
to a contemporary who campaigned against the black slave trade,  
kidnappers were snatching an average of around 10,000 whites a  
year - doubtless an exaggeration but one that indicates a problem  
serious enough to create its own grip on the popular mind.3

Along with the vast numbers ejected from Britain and forced to  
slave in the colonics were the still greater multitudes who went of  
their own free will: those who became indentured servants in the  
Americas in return for free passage and perhaps the promise of a plot  
of land. Between 1620 and 1775, these volunteer servants, some  
300,000, accounted for two out of three migrants from the British  
Isles.4 Typically, these 'free-\villcrs', as they came to be called, were  
the poor and the hopeful who agreed to sacrificc their personal  
liberty for a period of years in the eventual hope of a better life.  
On arrival, they found that they had the status of chattels, objects  
of personal property', with few effective rights. But there was no  
going back. They were stuck like the tar on the keels of the ships

that brought them. Some, of course, were bought by humane,  
even generous, masters and survived their years of bondage quite  
happily to emerge from servitude to build a prosperous future.  
But some of the most abused servants were from among the frce-  
willers.

### Alt

#### Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics

* Individualism warrant

**McLaren ‘06** (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, <http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm>, jj)

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (*Totalitarianism* 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

## Case

#### Their ontological framing of blackness dooms the aff. Placing Blackness as oppositional denies it any existence independent of white supremacy and makes identity reliant on oppression

Pinn, Macalester College Professor of Religious Studies, 4

(Anthony, Dialog: A Journal of Theology, Volume 43, Number 1, Spring 2004, '‘‘Black Is, Black Ain’t’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity', pg.57-58, Wiley online Library)

At its best, African American criticism draws from critical theory and has an appreciation for the human impulse toward creative transformation. Cultural fulfillment, not illusive blackness, is normative. The end product is a utopian yet pragmatic vision of life—fulfillment—forged in the arena of public (politicized) scrutiny, allowing for solid responses to the facts of contemporary black life. Yet the ques- tion remains: ‘‘what should African American cul- tural and religious criticism look like when they are no longer romantic in inspiration and the cult of heroic genius is displaced…?’’12 This connection between ontological blackness and religion is natural because: ‘‘ontological blackness sig- nifies the totality of black existence, a binding together of black life and experience. In its root, religio, religion denotes tying together, fastening behind, and binding together. Ontological blackness renders black life and experience a totality.’’13 According to Anderson, Black theological discussions are entangled in ontological blackness. And accordingly, discussions of black life revolve around a theological understanding of Black experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist system. The goal of this theology is to find the ‘‘mean- ing of black faith’’ in the merger of black cultural consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War II Black defiance. An admirable goal to be sure, but here is the rub: Black theologians speak, according to Anderson, in opposition to ontological whiteness when they are actually dependent upon whiteness for the legitimacy of their agenda. Furthermore, onto- logical blackness’s strong ties to suffering and survi- val result in blackness being dependent on suffering, and as a result social transformation brings into question what it means to be black and religious. Liberative outcomes ultimately force an iden- tity crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility. In Anderson’s words: Talk about liberation becomes hard to justify where freedom appears as nothing more than defiant self-assertion of a revolutionary racial consciousness that requires for its legitimacy the opposition of white racism. Where there exists no possibility of transcending the black- ness that whiteness created, African American theologies of liberation must be seen not only as crisis theologies; they remain theologies in a crisis of legitimation.14

***The politics of the 1AC is grounded in injuries of the past with no guide for the future---this reinscribes exclusion and foreclosures social justice***

**Bhambra, 10**—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

2 The Reification of Identity We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politicsthat can be best described as the problem of ***the reiﬁcation of politicised identities***. Brown (1995) positions herself within thedebate about identity politics by seeking to **elaborate on** “**the wounded character of** **politicised identity’s desire**” (ibid: 55); thatis, the problem of “wounded attachments” whereby a claim to identity becomes ***over-invested in its own historical suffering*** and ***perpetuates its injury*** through its refusal to give up its identity claim. Brown’s argument is that where politicised identity is founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, ***exclusion itself becomes perversely valorised in the continuance of that identity***. In such cases, group activity operates to maintain and reproduce the identity created by injury (exclusion) rather than– and indeed, often ***in opposition to – resolving the injurious social relations that generated claims around that identity in the ﬁrst place.*** If things have to have a history in order to have af uture, then the problem becomes that of how history is con-structed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for Brown, identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future for that identity is then ***already determined by the injury*** “as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history” (ibid 1995: 73). Brown’s sug-gestion that as it is not possible to undo the past, the focus back- wards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is, we believe,too stark and we will pursue this later in the article. Politicised identity, Brown maintains, “emerges and obtains its unifying coherence through the ***politicisation of exclusion from an ostensible universal***, as a protest against exclusion” (ibid: 65). Its continuing existence requires both a belief in the legitimacy of the universal ideal (for example, ideals of opportunity, and re- ward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from those ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that ***such identi-ties, produced in reaction to conditions of disempowerment*** andinequality, then ***become invested in their own impotence through practices of***, for example, reproach, complaint, and ***revenge***. These are “reactions” in the Nietzschean sense since they are substitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of action. ***Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suf-fering is instead ameliorated*** (to some extent) ***through “the estab-lishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue***” (ibid 1995:70), ***and is compensated for by the vengeful pleasures of recrimi-nation***. ***Such*** ***practices***, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to –in fact, ***provide obstacles to*** – ***practices that*** would ***seek to dispel the conditions of exclusion.*** Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choicebetween past and future, and adapting Nietzsche, exhorts theadoption of a (collective) will that would become the “redeemer of history” (ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creat-ing different futures. As Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thingthat the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the “it was”.Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of thepast, the will is threatened with becoming simply an “angry spec-tator” mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness. The onehope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery over that past such that, although “what has happened” cannotbe altered, the past can be denied the power of continuing to de-termine the present and future. It is only this focus on the future, Brown continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of human frailties and injustices that spares us from a rancorous decline into despair. Identity politics structured by ressentiment – that is, by suffering caused by past events – can only break outof the cycle of “slave morality” by remaking the present againstthe terms of the past, a remaking that requires a “forgetting” of that past. An act of liberation, of self-afﬁrmation, this “forgettingof the past” requires an “overcoming” of the past that offers iden-tity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in whichidentity is to be deﬁned differently. In arguing thus, Brown’s work becomes aligned with a posi-tion that sees the way forward for emancipatory politics as re-siding in a movement away from a “politics of memory” (Kilby 2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices andsuffering. While we agree that investment in identities prem-ised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating the causes of that suffering, we believe that Brown’s argument as outlined is problematic. First, following Kilby (2002), we share a concern about any turn to the future that is ﬁgured as a complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those who have suffered oppression and exclusion, the injunction to give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel and impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the “***turn to the future***” that theorists such as Brown and Grosz callfor, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, ***need not be conceived of as a brute rejection of the past***. Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here, stating that [since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves suchintegral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities[then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructedNietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74). She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in painmay be no more than the demand to exorcise that pain throughrecognition: “all that such pain may long for – more than revenge– is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised intoself-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence, losing itself” (1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to establish the political importance of remembering “painful” historical events but with a crucial caveat: that the purpose of remembering pain is to enable its release . The challenge then, according to her,is to create a political culture in which this project does not mutate into one of remembering pain for its own sake. Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be “a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche” (1995: 74), then Freud may be a more suit-able companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freud’s writ-ings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remember-ing is often a condition of forgetting. The hysterical patient, who is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions a past she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that trau-matic past in order then to move beyond it: she must remember inorder to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in the present. 7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for thedilemma articulated by both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002),insisting as it does that “forgetting” (at least, loosening the holdof the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved without ﬁrst remembering the traumatic past. Indeed, this wouldseem to be similar to the message of Beloved , whose central motif of haunting (is the adult woman, “Beloved”, Sethe’s murderedchild returned in spectral form?) dramatises the tendency of theunanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning, constraining, asit does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallow-ing the possibility of a future different from that past. As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, “***in order to break the seal of the past***, in order to move away from attach-ments that are hurtful, ***we must ﬁrst bring them into the realm of political action***” (2004: 33). We would add that the task of analys-ing the traumatic past, and thus opening up the possibility of political action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on their own, but that this, instead, requires a “community” of participants dedicated to the serious epistemic work of rememberingand interpreting the objective social conditions that made up thatpast and continue in the present. The “pain” of historical injury is not simply an individual psychological issue, but stems from objective social conditions which perpetuate, for the most part, forms of injustice and inequality into the present. In sum, Brown presents too stark a choice between past andfuture. In the example of Beloved with which we began thisarticle, Paul D’s acceptance of Sethe’s experiences of slavery asdistinct from his own, enable them both to arrive at new under-standings of their experience. Such understanding is a way of partially “undoing” the (effects of) the past and coming to terms with the locatedness of one’s being in the world (Mohanty 1995). As this example shows, opening up a future, and attending to theongoing effects of a traumatic past, are only incorrectly under-stood as alternatives. A second set of problems with Brown’s critique of identity poli-tics emerge from what we regard as her tendency to individualise social problems as problems that are the possession and theresponsibility of the “wounded” group. Brown suggests that the problems associated with identity politics can be overcome through a “shift in the character of political expression and politi-cal claims common to much politicised identity” (1995: 75). She deﬁnes this shift as one in which identity would be expressed in terms of ***desire rather than of ontology by supplanting the lan-guage of “I am” with the language of “I want this for us”*** (1995:75). Such a reconﬁguration, she argues, would create an opportu-nity to “rehabilitate the memory of desire within identiﬁcatory processes…prior to [their] wounding” (1995: 75). ***It would fur-ther refocus attention on the future possibilities present in theidentity as opposed to the identity being foreclosed through its attention to past-based grievances***.

***Resistance via the ballot can only instill an adaptive politics of being and effaces the institutional constraints that reproduce structural violence***

**Brown, 95**—prof at UC Berkely (Wendy, States of Injury, 21-3)

**For some**, fueled by opprobrium toward regulatory norms or other mo- dalities of domination, **the language of "resistance" has taken up** the **ground** vacated by a more expansive practice of freedom. **For others, it is the discourse of “empowerment”** that carries the ghost of freedom's valence ¶ 22¶. **Yet** as many have noted, **insofar as resistance is an effect of the regime it opposes** on the one hand, **and insofar as its practitioners often seek to *void it of normativity* to differentiate it from the (regulatory) nature of what it opposes** on the other, **it is at best** politically **rebellious; at worst, politically amorphous**. ***Resistance stands against***, ***not for;* it is re- action** to domination, rarely willing to admit to a desire for it, **and** it is ***neutral with regard to possible political direction***. Resistance is in no way constrained to a radical or emancipatory aim. a fact that emerges clearly as soon as one analogizes Foucault's notion of resistance to its companion terms in Freud or Nietzsche. Yet in some ways this point is less a critique of Foucault, who especially in his later years made clear that his political commitments were not identical with his theoretical ones (and un- apologetically revised the latter), than a sign of his misappropriation. For Foucault, resistance marks the presence of power and expands our under- standing of its mechanics, but it is in this regard an analytical strategy rather than an expressly political one. "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet. or rather consequently, this **resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power**. . . . (**T]he strictly relational character of power relationships** . . . **depends upon a multiplicity of points of resis- tance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations**.\*39 This appreciation of the extent to which ***resistance is by no means inherently subversive of power*** also reminds us that it is only by recourse to a very non-Foucaultian moral evaluation of power as bad or that which is to be overcome that it is possible to equate resistance with that which is good, progressive, or seeking an end to domination. ¶ If popular and academic notions of resistance attach, however weakly at times, to a tradition of protest, the other contemporary substitute for a discourse of freedom—“empowerment”—would seem to correspond more closely to a tradition of idealist reconciliation. **The language of resistance implicitly acknowledges the extent to which *protest always transpires inside the regime***; “**empowerment**,” **in contrast, registers the possibility of generating one’s capacities**, one’s “self-esteem,” one’s life course, without capitulating to constraints by particular regimes of power. **But in so doing**, contemporary **discourses of empowerment too often signal an oddly *adaptive and harmonious relationship with domination* insofar as they locate an individual’s sense of worth** and capacity **in the register of individual feelings**, **a register** implicitly **located on** some- thing of **an otherworldly plane vis-a-vis social and political power**. In this regard, **despite its apparent *locution of resistance* to subjection**, contem- porary **discourses of empowerment partake strongly of *liberal solipsism***—the radical decontextualization of the subject characteristic of¶ 23¶ liberal discourse that is key to the fictional sovereign individualism of liberalism. Moreover, **in its almost exclusive focus on subjects’ emotionalbearing** and self-regard, **empowerment is a formulation that converges with a regime’s own legitimacy needs in masking the power of the regime**.¶ This is not to suggest that talk of empowerment is always only illusion or delusion. It is to argue, rather, that while the notion of empowerment articulates that feature of freedom concerned with action, with being more than the consumer subject figured in discourses of rights and eco- nomic democracy, **contemporary deployments** of that notion also **draw so heavily on an undeconstructed subjectivity that they *risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) § Marked 13:10 § empowerment and an actual capacity to shape the terms of political, social, or economic life. Indeed, the possibility that one can “feel empowered” without being so forms an important element of legitimacy for the antidemocratic dimensions of liberalism***.

#### Their assumption of ontological blackness essentializes blackness as a racial category subservient to whiteness

Welcome, 4– completing his PhD at the sociology department of the City University of New York's Graduate Center (H. Alexander, "White Is Right": The Utilization of an Improper Ontological Perspective in Analyses of Black Experiences, Journal of African American Studies, Summer-Fall 2004, Vol. 8, No. 1 & 2, pp. 59-73)

**In many of the studies of blacks, the experiences of whites, not blacks, are used as the backing for the construction of the warrants/rules that are employed to evaluate black experiences**, delimiting the "concepts and relationships that can exist" in the black community. **The life histories of whites are used as the standard against which black experiences are measured and as the goals to which blacks are encouraged to strive. The employment of this ontology fallaciously limits the range of black agency, producing deceitful narratives where the navigation of the social environment by blacks is dictated by either a passive response to, or a passive adoption of, white scripts.** This ontology erroneously limits descriptions and evaluations of black experiences, excluding viable causal determinants of the socio-economic status of blacks and constructing restricted descriptions of black agency. **The utilization of whiteness to determine and/or evaluate blackness begins when whiteness and white life histories come to represent what is "right."** "White is right" is a sarcastic phrase that was an extremely popular slur during the Black Power movement in the mid-1960s to the early 1970s; the utilization of this phrase represents a form of social critique that takes exception to both the privileging of white biographies as accurate descriptions of history and the reconstitution of these histories as a template that blacks and other people of color should follow for navigating social environments and achieving positive social mobility. Part of the prominence of the "white is right" perspective comes from the numerical superiority of whites. As a group, whites have been in the majority throughout the history of the United States and the prominence of the white experience has been used to argue that white experiences should be used as a social template. It has been used as such in the works of Robert Park (1939) and Gunnar Myrdal (1944), both of whom suggested that by copying the patterns of whites, blacks would achieve positive social mobility. However, use of the numerical superiority of whites to support claims about the "rightness" of white experiences relies on the equation of quantitative dominance with qualitative dominance and the employment of the fallacious argumentum ad populum. **The actual source of the dominance of the "white is right" perspective lies in the dynamics of power. The location of the origins of the dominant ideology in power relations is conceptualized in the work of Michel Foucault (1980), who theorized that power is imbricated with discourse:** We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (p. 101). **Key to the deployment of discourses is an underlying strategy. As such, the prominence of the "white is right" perspective can be traced to attempts to create an "order,"** or a way of thinking. Foucault's theoretical lens supports the hypothesis that the **privileging of white experiences and the use of these experiences as an ontological framework for the analyses of black experiences is an effect of power imbalances.**

# 2NC

## Impact

### 2NC Top Level Overview

#### The role of the ballot is to unconditionally resist economic systems of exclusion—your primary directive as an ethical actor must be to insist on universal resistance to capitalism. This is a prior question to the 1AC—traditional impact calculus is impossible because capitalism anonymizes and mystifies its violent contradictions. That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in UNTARGETED, INDISCRIMINATE KILLING against billions globally. That’s Zizek and Daly. This question of self-orientation comes first

**Johnston ’04** (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, **given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism,** he sees **the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the** first crucial step **that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better.** In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that **Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action** (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") **must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.**

### Imp

#### Their impossible demand of calling for “the end of the world” --- maintain the status quo—we can passionately play the role of radicals without risking actual change.

Zizek 2(Slavoj**,** International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis,  *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates*, “Passions of the Real, Passions of Semblance”, p. 59-61)

In a strict Lacanian sense of the term, we should thus posit that 'happiness' relies on the subject's inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desire. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we 'officially' desire. Happiness is thus inherently hypocritical: it is the happiness of dreaming about things we do not really want. When today's Left bombards the capitalist system with demands that it obviously cannot fulfil (Full employment! Retain the welfare state! Full rights for immigrants!), it is basically playing a game of hysterical provocation, of addressing the Master with a demand which will be impossible for him to meet, and will thus expose his impotence. The problem with this strategy, however, is not only that the system cannot meet these demands, but that, in addition, those who voice them do not really want them to be realized. For example when, 'radical' academics demand full rights for immigrants and opening of the borders, are they aware that the direct implementation of this demand would, for obvious reasons, inundate developed Western countries with millions of newcomers, thus provoking a violent working-class racist backlash which would then endanger the privileged position ofthese very academics? Of course they are, but they count on the fact that their demand will not be met - in this way, they can hypocritically retain their clear radical conscience while continuing to enjoy their privileged position. In 1994, when a new wave of emigration from Cuba to the USA was on the cards, Fidel Castro warned the USA that if they did not stop inciting Cubans to emigrate, Cuba would no longer prevent them from doing it - which the Cuban authorities in effect did a couple of days later, embarrassing the USA with thousands of unwanted newcomers.... Is this not like the proverbial woman who snapped back at a man who was making macho advances to her: 'Shut up, or you'll have to do what you're boasting about!' In both cases, the gesture is that of calling the other's bluff, counting on the fact that what the other really fears is that one will fully comply with his or her demand. And would not the same gesture also throw our radical academics into a panic? Here the old '68 motto 'Soy0ns realistes, demandons l'impossible!' acquires a new cynical and sinister meaning which, perhaps, reveals its truth: 'Let's be realists: we, the academic Left, want to appear critical, while fully enjoying the privileges the system offers us. So let's bombard the system with impossible demands: we all know that these demands won't be met, so we can be sure that nothing will actually change, and we'll maintain our privileged status!' If someone accuses a big corporation of particular financial crimes, he or she is exposed to risks which can go right up to murder attempts; if he or she asks the same corporation to finance a research project into the link between global capitalism and the emergence of hybrid postcolonial identities, he or she stands a good chance of getting hundreds ofthousands of dollars.

## Root cause

### \*\*2NC – EXT – RC of Slavery

#### The claim that race produced slavery is an empirical one—thus you should judge the evidence for it based on historical fact, not abstract theory. Most aff evidence is solely conclusionary—consensus goes neg

Drescher 97 [Seymour, Department of History, University of Pittsburgh; Slavery & Abolition, 18: 3, 212 — 227]

Perhaps the best point of departure is the collective volume that emerged from the fortieth anniversary conference on Capitalism and Slavery, held at Bellagio, Italy, and was published in 1987. The editors, Barbara L. Solow and Stanley L. Engerirían, divided the non-biographical contributions into three parts, corresponding to three major hypotheses on the relationship between economic development and slavery in the British empire. We may appropriately test the first hypothesis most briefly. Williams only briefly broached the subject and his assessment has not been of major historiographical interest in the subsequent literature. Williams took the position that economic factors rather than racism occupied pride of place in the switch to African labour in the plantation Americas, that slavery 'was not born of racism' but rather slavery led to racism. Although some recent interpretations make racial preferences and inhibitions central to the choice of African labour, Williams's order of priorities, if not his either-or approach, is supported by a survey of hundreds of articles. They **show virtual unanimity** on the primacy of economics in accounting for the turn toward slave labour. Non-economic factors, such as race or religion, entered into the development of New World slavery only as a limiting parameter. Such factors affected the historical sequence by which entire human groups (Christians, Jews, Muslim North Africans, Native Americans) were excluded from liability to enslavement in the Atlantic system. Since Williams published his book, the main change in the historiographical context of origins is an increase in the number and variety of actors brought into the process. That broader context complicates the role of any exclusively 'African' racial component of the slave trade. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, slavery, even the English colonial varieties, was hardly synonymous with Africans. Nor were Africans synonymous with slaves. In the African sector of the Atlantic system Europeans were forced to regard Africans (and Afro-Europeans) as autonomous and even locally dominant participants in the slave trade. They were often dominant militarily and were certainly dominant in terms of their massive presence and limited vulnerability to local diseases. Even in the Americas, Africans did not arrive only as captives and deracinated slaves.

#### Post-fordism warehouses surplus populations- explains the drug war and and incarceration

Carter Wilson April, 2012 “The Dominant Class and the Construction of Racial Oppression: A Neo-Marxist/Gramscian Approach to Race in the United States Socialism and Democracy http://postcapitalistproject.org/node/92

Another severe impact of the Post-Fordist period, particularly on blacks, is the warehousing of surplus populations. Four trends reflect the severe racial repression associated with Post-Fordism. First, incarceration rates in the US have increased exponentially since 1980. In 1980 about 1.8 million people were in the system (jail, prison, probation or parole). About 400,000 were in jail or prison. By 2007, there were over 7.3 million in the system and over 2.3 million incarcerated.35 The United States incarcerates more people than ever before in its history and more people than any other nation in the world. Whereas the US only has 5% of the world population, it holds 25% of the world’s prisoners.36¶ Second, the increase in the prison population has been tied directly into surplus populations, the populations of the poor and unemployed. The overwhelming majority of those incarcerated are poor people and people of color:¶ ¶ Across all racial groups, prisoners are drawn from the poorest sectors of society. A large percentage (of prisoners) are unemployed at the time of their arrest or have only sporadic employment. Of those with jobs, many have incomes near or below the poverty level. Seventy-two percent of prison inmates and 60 percent of jail inmates have not completed high school; many are illiterate….¶ The statistical link between unemployment or underemployment and imprisonment is borne out in the demographic characteristics of prison populations. In 1990, 58.2 percent of all those jailed (about 561,700 people) were unemployed at the time of their arrest. Roughly 68 percent earned less than $15,000 a year. State prison populations reveal a similar link. In Florida, for example, of nearly 30,000 people imprisoned in 1986, barely half (52 percent) were employed full-time at the time of their arrest. Nearly half earned less than $500 a month.37¶ ¶ Third, not only does the US have the highest incarceration rate in the world, it incarcerates a higher percentage of its minority population than any other country. The US incarceration rate is 702 per 100,000. The nearest competitor is Russia with a rate of 628. US incarceration rates are much higher for male populations. The white male incarceration rate is 736 per 100,000. This high rate is indicative of a class repressive society. The black male incarceration rate is an alarming 4,789 per 100,000. This rate is indicative of an extreme racially repressive society.38 In 2006 there were about 836,800 black males in jail or prison out of a population of about 18,262,000 black males.39 That is, about 4.58% of the total black male population. The percentage is much higher when the age group of 20 to 29 is considered, close to 10%.40¶ Fourth, the repressive level of incarceration rates of blacks is a function of racial stereotypes and racial targeting of black populations. Conventional wisdom suggests that more black males are arrested for using and selling crack cocaine because this drug is more popular in the inner city and black dealers sell it openly in public places, thus making themselves targets. However, Michelle Anderson points out in her research that suburban whites buy their drugs – cocaine, ecstasy, crack – from a local white dealer who also sells in public. Police agencies target the black inner city drug dealers, but ignore the white suburban dealers.41 Moreover, research indicates that the overwhelming majority of drug users are white. Marc Mauer of the Sentencing Project says, “Thus, SAMHSA data indicates that whites represent 77 percent of current drug users, African Americans constitute 15 percent and Hispanic 8 percent”; he adds that black crack cocaine use is 0.6% of the population compared to a white use of 0.2%.42 However, given their much greater proportion of the population, the white user rate translates into whites representing 54% of current crack cocaine users, blacks 34% and Hispanics 12%. Nevertheless, blacks constitute close to 90% of those arrested for crack cocaine use.43¶ A further indicator of a racially repressive society is the increase of draconian laws used in a racially discriminatory way to target African Americans. A good example of this is the mandatory sentences of five years for possession of five grams of crack cocaine, a law used to target African American users and dealers. Another example is the establishment of mandatory life sentences for three or more felonies. In the Ewing v California decision the US Supreme Court allowed a mandatory life sentence for the theft of three golf clubs.44 A further example is the imposition of life sentences for two felony drug offenses. In Georgia, over 98% of those sentenced to life for two or more drug offenses are black.45¶ The targeting of African Americans is not limited to adults. Recently, Human Rights Watch cited the United States for human rights violations for sentencing youth offenders to life imprisonment without any chance of parole and for racial biases in the sentencing. The report reads:¶ ¶ Our data reveal that blacks constitute 60 percent of the youth offenders serving life without parole nationwide and whites constitute 29 percent…. However, research studies have found that minority youths receive harsher treatment than similarly situated white youths at every stage of the criminal justice system from the point of arrest to sentencing.46¶ ¶ The incarceration rate is so high and sentences so severe that some critics refer to the United States as “the warehouse society,” warehousing a significant proportion of its poor and minorities. They refer to the explosive growth of the prison population as “correctional Keynesianism.” Regardless of these titles, large numbers of the poor and unemployed from industrial cities are warehoused in prisons, thus artificially reducing the unemployment and poverty rates.

### Root Cause – Slavery – A2: Eltis

#### Here is evidence to prove everything said in the cross ex about wilderson and eltis is wrong – eltis is a bad scholar

Schmidt-Nowara 02 [Christopher, Professor of History and Associate Chair at the Lincoln Center campus at Fordham University, “Big Questions and Answers: Three Histories of Slavery, the Slave Trade and the Atlantic World” typos because of OCRing, Social History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 210-217]

Bold, but not always convincing. This reader found the volume's most controversial thesis, that the use of African slavery was an uneconomic decision guided by European racial and gender ideologies, particularly weak in its demonstration. Eltis wants to show that the social and institutional factors that would have permitted widespread European enslavement were in place in the early modern period (57-84). In doing so, he marshals impressive evidence about the various forms of coercive labour existing in early modern western Europe, such as indenture and convict labour. Given the prevalence of overt coercion in Europe, he asks, why did European elites not take the next step and enslave and transport Europeans in vast numbers? In doing so, he also examines and finds wanting explanations for African slavery based on epidemiological and economic assumptions. Europeans adapted as well as Africans to New World climates, while the shipping costs from Europe would have been cheaper than those from Africa. For Eltis, the explanation for this uneconomic behaviour lies in the realm of cultural values that bound all Europeans regardless of their class position: What seems incontestable is that in regard to slavery the sense of the appropriate was shared across social divisions and cannot easily be explained by ideological differences or power relationships among classes. Outrage at the treatment of Africans was rarely expressed at any level of society before the late eighteenth century. . . . For elite and non-elite alike enslavement remained a fate for which only non-Europeans were qualified. (83-4) Eltis's conclusion regarding a shared European racial identity and sense of racial supremacy is evocative and cannot be dismissed easily, if at all. But what this account lacks is sustained consideration of alternative types of sources and historical approaches that might reinforce or modify it. Eltis makes an inelegant leap from his counter-factual of mass European enslavement to his explanation of why it did not take place; his claim of homogeneity of racial values reads more like an assertion than a proof. For instance, there is little effort to flesh out the values he attributes to Europeans of the period, largely because his study is short on the types of sources that historians employ to plumb the beliefs of human cultures, such as pamphlets, broadsheets, autobiographies and memoirs, philosophical tracts or records of political and religious rituals. It would be foolish to demand of Eltis that he use these sources himself after such meticulous research into economic history. But it is quite reasonable to expect a more sophisticated engagement with historians who have reached alternative conclusions about early modern European culture through different sources and methods. Readers of E. P. Thompson, Natalie Zemon Davis or Carlo Ginzburg will be surprised to learn that early modern European society was so cohesive and homogenous in its values. They will also be dismayed by the indifference Eltis displays towards questions of resistance and agency and his glib dismissal of class conflict and consciousness as useful analytical categories (84). Historians working in the broader field of Atlantic history have also tended to see Europe as a contentious society, most notably Seymour Drescher, who sees class conflict in the industrialization process as a major factor in the rise of British anti-slavery. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker have expanded the temporal and spatial dimensions of that conflict in their recent account of popular anti-slavery sentiment and cross-racial alliances against slavery in the early modern Atlantic.5 This is not to say categorically that these scholars are correct and Eltis wrong. Rather, to make his argument more robust and persuasive, Eltis needs to engage, not sidestep, the important scholarly literature that belies his conclusions. Any explanation of the absence of European enslavement and the apparent indifference towards African slavery must take into account the balance of political and social forces that produced some semblance of autonomy and liberty among the European working classes as well as cultural assumptions about race and gender. Eltis s instinct about the cultural origins of African slavery in the Americas is plausible but, given the narrow perspective from which he addresses the issue, his conclusion is not. Robin Blackburn's The Making of New World Slavery is more varied in its approach and interpretation. While insisting, unlike Eltis, upon the driving force of 'civil society' in the construction of the plantation complex (6-12), Blackburn none the less handles questions of ideology and politics with great care and insight. This multipronged explanatory method was also evident in his earlier volume, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848, which today reads as perhaps the most cogent narrative of the forces at work in the Atlantic world's 'age of revolution'. One of the qualities that makes The Overthrow so attractive is the intermixture of a trenchant analysis of the political economy of war, empire, decolonization, abolitionism and slave rebellion with the invocation of a 'usable past' with which Blackburn introduces the volume: Despite the mixed results of anti-slavery in this period the sacrifices of slave rebels, of radical abolitionists and of revolutionary democrats were not in vain. They show how it was possible to challenge, and sometimes defeat, the oppression which grew as the horrible obverse of the growth of human social capacities and powers in the Atlantic world of the early modern period. More generally they are of interest in illuminating the ways in which, however incompletely or imperfectly, emancipatory interests can prevail against ancient law and custom and the spirit of ruthless accumulation.6 The task of the present volume is to explain the construction of the powerful political and economic complex that was undone in the nineteenth century. Like Eltis, Blackburn emphasizes European actions and decision-making in the process. The book's first section is tided 'The Selection of New World Slavery' and ranges from medieval Europe to the eighteenth-century Caribbean. It follows the tracks of the Iberian conquerors and their northern European imitators and inheritors, thus cutting effectively across the different European empires (the same is true of the works of Eltis and Thornton), unlike many Atlantic histories which exclude Iberia and Latin America.7 The selection of African slavery in the Americas was a tortuous process which involved experiments with indentured European labour and Indian slavery. Numerous factors made these alternatives unsatisfactory for the various European colonizers. Spain found a viable labour source in Indian waged labour and forms of coercion associated with the mita, encomienda and repartimiento in its imperial core, the mining centres of Peru and Mexico. Given the emphasis on bullion, rather than sugar, Spain found less use for African slave labour than did the other European colonizers (though African slavery was important in virtually every branch of the Spanish colonial economy). Not until the Cuban plantation economy took off in the later eighteenth century did the Spanish empire see the intensive use of slave labour for sugar cultivation that was the magnet for the Atlantic slave trade.8 The Portuguese, Dutch, English and French American colonies, in contrast, came to be based on the sugar plantation from north-eastern Brazil to the Caribbean. From the later sixteenth through the later seventeenth centuries these powers tested European and Indian labour before turning full-force to the African slave trade. Blackburn coincides with Eltis in that he acknowledges important ideological motives in the selection of African slavery, finding precedents for European practices in Roman law and Europeans' early association of Africans with slavery and servitude (31-93). Also, like Eltis, he notes the virtual absence of European criticism of African slavery, figures like the Spanish clerics Bartolome de las Casas and Alonso de Sandoval being few and far between. However, he places more explanatory power in existing economic and political forces. Not only was slavery entrenched in West Africa (as Thornton carefully discusses), but the development of class relations in late medieval and early modern western Europe precluded the mass enslavement and especially the hereditary enslavement - of Europeans, an explanation that Blackburn synchronizes with the arguments of Edmund Morgan, Richard Dunn and K. G. Davies.9 Blackburn sees ideas regarding race, or what Eltis calls 'cultural values', in Weberian terms as '"switchmen", selecting different paths of historical development' (357). Racism was a cause of the implantation of African slavery in the Americas and, therefore, more than an epiphenomenon of the master-slave relationship. **But it was not the primary one**. For Blackburn, the explanations of the rise of slavery by historians like Morgan, Davies and Dunn, who emphasize economic, political and institutional factors, are more convincing than Eltis s depiction of racism as the motive force behind American slavery, a thesis Blackburn rebuts at length and counters with his own counter-factual construction of an Atlantic system built on free, instead of bonded, labour (350-63).10 Blackburn's discussion of the selection of African slavery is wide-ranging and comprehensive. It is surely the single best place to read about the early phase of African slavery in the Americas. Many of his conclusions in this section will be familiar to scholars of slavery and colonialism, something Blackburn himself acknowledges through references to the works of Morgan and Dunn and his own reworking of the Freyre—Tannenbaum thesis regarding the differences between Iberian and northern European, especially English, slave societies. The former Blackburn calls 'baroque','an alternative modernity to that associated with the Puritan ethic' (20-1). This modernity was more inclusive (though hierarchical and exploitative) than the British and French plantation colonies, where slaves were not treated as members of a stratified yet organic community beholden to Crown and Church, but as mere factors of production in a ruthlessly capitalistic vision of modernity.11 The latter, however, won out, as Blackburn argues in the second half of the book, 'Slavery and Accumulation'. Barbados, Jamaica and St Domingue were the pinnacle of the early modern Atlantic plantation complex, importing hundreds of thousands of slaves and exporting vast quantities of sugar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. England, in particular, emerged triumphant, in part because of the victorious slaves of St Domingue/Haiti who overthrew their bondage at the end of the eighteenth century, but also because England settled on a more successful colonial policy that encouraged investment and innovation both in the metropolis and the colonies. In Blackburn's characterization, English colonialism was 'orchestrated by an inverted mercantilism - that is to say, not by financiers and merchants serving raison d'etat but by the state serving capitalist purposes. . . . The colonial and Adantic regime of extended primitive accumulation allowed metropolitan accumulation to break out of its agrarian and national limits and discover an industrial and global destiny' (515). In the chapter entided 'New World slavery, primitive accumulation and British industrialization', Blackburn takes the exact opposite position from Eltis, arguing that colonial slavery was the foundation of England's industrial revolution, a labyrinthine account that takes him through the works of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Eric Hobsbawm, Charles Kindelberger, Paul Bairoch and Stanley Engerman, among others (510-80). The length and care of that chapter indicates one of the major purposes of The Making of New World Slavery. This work is not just about the rise of African slavery in the Americas; it is also about the rise of the 'West'. How and why did Europe emerge as the world's dominant power? For Blackburn, Europe's ascendancy led directly through the early modern Atlantic world. Indeed, while his two volumes have come to occupy centre stage in the historiography of the rise and fall of Atlantic slavery, his work must also be seen in relationship to the recent revisions in British sociology of the ideas of Marx and Weber concerning the origins and nature of capitalist modernity and the nation-state. Michael Mann, Perry Anderson, Ernest Gellner, John Hall and Anthony Giddens - as much as C. L. R. James and Fernando Ortiz - are his peers.12 The most comparable figure is Paul Gilroy. Like Gilroy's The Black Atlantic, The Making of New World Slavery seeks to demonstrate that the Atlantic slave complex was the wheelhouse — and slaughterhouse - of modernity. Whereas Gilroy focuses on the Black experience of modernity forged in the Atlantic world and Black reflections on that experience, Blackburn approaches the slave complex as the pivot of European industrialization and state formation. Though his work builds up to an evaluation of European modernity, it would be a gross simplification to call the work of Blackburn, or Eltis, Eurocentric. However, it is correct to say that the two works do focus on European actions, interests and decisions and conclude with incisive arguments about the impact of slavery on European economic, political and social development. Just such a focus John Thornton seeks to displace by emphasizing the actions, interests and decisions of Africans in the making of the Atlantic world. How Africans influenced the origins and management of the Atlantic slave trade and how Africans affected the culture of the New World colonies are his major concerns. A reader like myself who works on Europe and the Americas will find this work indispensable both as a conceptual tool and as an introduction to various historiographies pertaining to Africa and to Africans in the Americas. The book's most provocative and counter-intuitive section,' Africans in Africa', discusses the origins and development of the slave trade and is most comparable to the other works discussed here. Thornton makes a strong case that the decisive players in the process were not Europeans but Africans. He constructs his argument through various considerations. Slavery was a fundamental institution in most West African societies, though it differed greatly from the plantation slavery of the Americas. Slaves in West Africa, usually captured in the endemic wars among the myriad polities of the region, fulfilled a wide variety of roles, from menial labour to administrative and military leadership. Slavery was not necessarily associated with a society's most debased tasks, as it was in the American plantation zone. It was not based on colour, nor was it hereditary, the most pernicious of changes in slavery as it crossed the Atlantic (72-97). Moreover, Thornton takes great pains to show that the European presence on the west coast of Africa, with the possible exception of the Portuguese in Angola, was weak and completely dependent on the interests and goodwill of African states and merchants. These latter were the true masters of the slave trade. In making this argument, Thornton is consciously inverting the terms of dependency theory explanations of the origins and impact of the slave trade. Pointing specifically to the work of Walter Rodney (43), Thornton disputes the view that the origins of the slave trade lay in European military and commercial superiority, that the immediate consequences of the European presence were an escalation of African warfare, and that the longer term consequences were a drain on African human capital and the bending of the African economy to European interests (a description captured in the title of Rodney's influential work How Europe Underdeveloped Africa).,3 Thornton, in contrast, argues that Africans held the upper hand. Different African states possessed sophisticated naval technologies well adapted to the coastal environment that made effective penetration impossible for the Europeans. European efforts to subdue African kingdoms through force of arms met with repeated failure. Confronted with a military and naval foe of equal or greater strength, Europeans had no choice but to establish small trading forts on islands off the coast of Africa. Such a weak presence, Thornton holds, had very little effect on the nature of African politics. The same was true of Europe's economic impact on the region. In the lengthy chapter 'The process of enslavement and the slave trade', Thornton argues that it was not the temptation of European commodities such as guns that stoked the slave trade and African warfare. Rather, war among African states responded more frequently to internal political pressures, while African slave traders had various markets open to them, so that selling to Europeans was only one option among others. Economic decisions regarding the pace and volume of the slave trade were made by Africans. Europeans, therefore, and not Africans, were in a dependent position: 'African participation in the slave trade was voluntary and under the control of African decision makers. This was not just at the surface level of daily exchange but even at deeper levels. Europeans possessed no means, either economic or military, to compel African leaders to sell slaves' (125). Thornton bases his arguments on an extensive scholarly literature and on close readings of primary sources. Those sources were produced almost exclusively by Europeans in European languages. This situation thus opens an intriguing question that Thornton does not directly address: what does it mean that an argument about African primacy in military and economic encounters with Europeans relies heavily on the European perspective? Thornton's method of interpreting documents relevant to the slave trade and to African cultures in the Americas is familiar: frequently he checks them against contemporary anthropological studies of African cultures and societies and reads those back into the historical sources. Such a method is generally convincing, but it also implies a historical hierarchy. In the written record, Europeans are the active agents, Africans their objects of description and contemplation. The prevalence of the European perspective in the writing of the history of the slave trade thus led this reader to puzzle over Thornton's virtual effacement of colonialism from his explanation of Atlantic slavery's rise (and of the legacies of colonialism in the writing of history). His argument about African autonomy and agency is forceful and persuasive, and he demonstrates spectacularly that the history of Atlantic slavery is not only the history of the rise of the West. But by inverting the terms of the dependency theory approach of Rodney and others, Thornton eclipses Europe's role in the making of both the Atlantic slave trade and the American plantation, without which the slave trade would never have existed. Should he have presented a more balanced account? Maybe not; balance is not necessarily the only virtue of the Atlantic historian. To argue with rigour, imagination and over a broad canvas are the marks of the great histories of Atlantic slavery. Thornton, Blackburn and Eltis are squarely in that tradition and, like C. L. R. James, Fernando Ortiz, David Brion Davis, Seymour Drescher and others before them, they have produced works that incite the reader to ask big questions and reach for big answers about a history whose legacies continue to shape the Atlantic world.

### \*\*\*A2: Reductionist / Intersectionality

#### Intersecting inequality is real, but prior focus on class antagonism is key to historicize the oppression they outline and address collective imperatives

* Their argument ignores class differences with other identities…

Petras, 97 (James, Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, November 1997, A Marxist critique of post-Marxists, <http://www.rebelion.org/hemeroteca/petras/english/critique170102.htm>, jj)

The post-Marxists attack the Marxist notion of class analysis from various perspectives. On the one hand, they claim that it obscures the equal or more significant importance of cultural identities (gender, ethnicity). They accuse class analysts of being “economic reductionists” and failing to explain gender and ethnic differences within classes. They then proceed further to argue that these “differences” define the nature of contemporary politics. The second line of attack on class analysis stems from a view that class is merely an intellectual constructionit is essentially a subjective phenomenon that is culturally determined. Hence, there are no “objective class interests” that divide society since “interests” are purely subjective and each culture defines individual preferences. The third line of attack argues that there have been vast transformations in the economy and society that have obliterated the old class distinctions. In “post-industrial” society, some post-Marxists argue, the source of power is in the new information systems, the new technologies and those who manage and control them. Society, according to this view, is evolving toward a new society in which industrial workers are disappearing in two directions: upward into the “new middle class” of high technology and downward into the marginal “underclass”.

Marxists have never denied the importance of racial, gender and ethnic divisions within classes. What they have emphasised, however, is the wider social system which generates these differences and the need to join class forces to eliminate these inequalities at every point: work, neighborhood, family. What most Marxists object to is the idea that gender and race inequalities can and should be analysed and solved outside of the class framework: that landowner women with servants and wealth have an essential “identity” with the peasant women who are employed at starvation wages; that Indian bureaucrats of neo-liberal governments have a common “identity” with peasant Indians who are displaced from their land by the free market economic policies. For example, Bolivia has an Indian vice-president presiding over the mass arrest of cocoa-growing Indian farmers.

Identity politics in the sense of consciousness of a particular form of oppression by an immediate group can be an appropriate point of departure. This understanding, however, will become an “identity prison” (race or gender) isolated from other exploited social groups unless it transcends the immediate points of oppression and confronts the social system in which it is embedded. And that requires a broader class analysis of the structure of social power which presides over and defines the conditions of general and specific inequalities.

#### We have to foreground class, not footnote it—their claim to have mentioned economics and class in passing during the 1AC is the link. The reduction of class to a neutral level among a long list of other oppressions such as race, destroys the emancipatory potential of class to reach across all lines of identity and forge political action. Class must be recognized as qualitatively more important—otherwise the system is able to satisfy demands on grounds of formal equality, destroying attempts to overcome capitalist oppression\*

Giminez, ’01 [Martha, Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: <http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html>]  
  
There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. **This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory**, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). **Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it.** Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). **Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators** (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). **Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher** (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. **The working class**, on the other hand**, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital** and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). **While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged**. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. **The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth**, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. **In so far as** the **"class"** in RGC **remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.** Nevertheless, **I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument** not only **on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change** but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that **some power relations are more important and consequential than others**. **For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former**. In my view, **the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations.** In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression**, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination**. **Class relations** -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- **are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them.** **Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers.** **Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances.** **To argue**, then, **that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.**

## Perm

#### The aff reflects the ideology of Occupy. Claiming “debate space” as a site for organic, horizontalist politics sells out radical change to the private sphere of individual performance.

Marcus 2012 – associate book editor at Dissent Magazine (Fall, David, “The Horizontalists”, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-horizontalists)

There is a much-recycled and certainly apocryphal tale told of an ethnographer traveling in India. Journeying up and down the Ganges Delta, he encounters a fisherman who claims to know the source of all truth. “The world,” the fisherman explains, “rests upon the back of an elephant.”

“But what does the elephant stand on?” the ethnographer asks.

“A turtle.”

“And the turtle?”

“Another turtle.”

“And it?”

“Ah, friend,” smiles the fisherman, “it is turtles all the way down.”

As with most well-circulated apocrypha, it is a parable that lacks a clear provenance, but has a clear moral: that despite our ever-dialectical minds, we will never get to the bottom of things; that, in fact, ***there is nothing*** at the bottom of things. What we define as society is nothing more than a set of locally constructed practices and norms, and what we define as history is nothing more than the passage of one set to the next. Although we might “find the picture of our universe as an infinite tower of tortoises rather ridiculous,” as one reteller admitted, it only raises the question, “Why do we think we know better?”

Since the early 1970s we have wondered—with increasing anxiety—why and if we know better. Social scientists, literary critics, philosophers, and jurists have all begun to turn from their particular disciplines to the more general question of interpretation. There has been an **increasing uneasiness with universal categories of thought**; a whispered suspicion and then a commonly held belief that the sum—societies, histories, identities—never amounts to more than its parts. New analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to both the pluralities and localities of life. “What we need,” as Clifford Geertz argued, “are not enormous ideas” but “ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities.”

This growing anxiety over the precision of our interpretive powers has translated into a variety of political as well as epistemological concerns. Many have become uneasy with universal concepts of justice and equality. Simultaneous to—and in part because of—the ascendance of human rights, freedom has increasingly become understood as an individual entitlement instead of a collective possibility. The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal values could bind society together has transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then decisions can take place only on a local scale and on a horizontal plane. There is no overarching platform from which to legislate; only a “local knowledge.” As Michael Walzer argued in a 1985 lecture on social criticism, “We have to start from where we are,” we can only ask, “what is the right thing ***for us*** to do?”

This shift in scale has had a significant impact on the Left over the past twenty to thirty years. Socialism, once the “name of our desire,” has all but disappeared; new desires have emerged in its place: situationism, autonomism, localism, communitarianism, environmentalism, anti-globalism. Often spatial in metaphor, they have been more concerned with where and how politics happen rather than at what pace and to what end. Often local in theory and in practice, they have come to represent a shift in scale: from the large to the small, from the vertical to the horizontal, and from—what Geertz has called—the “thin” to the “thick.”

Class, race, and gender—those classic left themes—are, to be sure, still potent categories. But they have often been imagined as spectrums rather than binaries, varying shades rather than static lines of solidarity. Instead of society, there is now talk of communities and actor networks; instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on localized campaigns and everyday practices. The critique of capitalism—once heavily informed by intricate historical and social theories—has narrowed. The “ruthless criticism of all,” as Karl Marx once put it, has turned away from exploitative world systems to the pathologies of an over-regulated life. As post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe declared in 1985,

Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The “evident truths” of the past—the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left’s struggles and objectives—have been seriously challenged….From Budapest to Prague and the Polish coup d’état, from Kabul to the sequels of Communist victory in Vietnam and Cambodia, a question-mark has fallen more and more heavily over the whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it.

In many ways, the Left has just been keeping up with the times. Over the last quarter-century, there has been a general fracturing of our social and economic relations, a “multiplication of,” what one sociologist has called, “partial societies—grouped by age, sex, ethnicity, and proximity.” This has not necessarily been a bad thing. Even as the old Left—the ***vertical*** Left—frequently bemoaned the growing differentiation and individuation, these new categories did, in fact, open the door for marginalized voices and communities. They created a space for more diversity, tolerance, and inclusion. They signaled a turn toward the language of recognition: a politics more sensitive to difference. But this turn was also not without its disadvantages. Gone was the Left’s hope for an emerging class consciousness, a movement of the “people” seeking greater realms of freedom. Instead of challenging the top-down structures of late capitalism, radicals now aspired to create—what post-Marxists were frequently calling—“spaces of freedom.” If one of the explicit targets of the global justice movement of the late 1990s was the exploitative trade policies of the World Trade Organization, then its underlying critique was the alienating patterns of its bureaucracy: the erosion of spaces for self-determination and expression. The crisis of globalization was that it stripped individuals of their rights to participate, to act as free agents in a society that was increasingly becoming shaped by a set of global institutions. What most troubled leftists over the past three or four decades was not the increasingly unequal distribution of goods and services in capitalist societies but the increasingly unequal distribution of power. As one frequently sighted placard from the 1999 Seattle protests read, “No globalization without participation!”

Occupy Wall Street has come to represent the latest turn in this movement toward local and more horizontal spaces of freedom. Occupation was, itself, a matter of recovering local space: a way to repoliticize the square. And in a moment characterized by foreclosure, it was also symbolically, and sometimes literally, an attempt to reclaim lost homes and abandoned properties. But there was also a deeper notion of space at work. Occupy Wall Street sought out not only new political spaces but also new ways to relate to them. By resisting the top-down management of representative democracy as well as the bottom-up ideals of labor movements, Occupiers hoped to create a new politics in which decisions moved neither up nor down but horizontally. While embracing the new reach of globalization—linking arms and webcams with their encamped comrades in Madrid, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Santiago—they were also rejecting its patterns of consolidation, its limits on personal freedom, its vertical and bureaucratic structures of decision-making.

Time was also to be transformed. The general assemblies and general strikes were efforts to reconstruct, and make more autonomous, our experience of time as well as space. Seeking to escape from the Taylorist demands of productivity, the assemblies insisted that decision-making was an endless process. Who we are, what we do, what we want to be are categories of flexibility, and consensus is as much about repairing this sense of open-endedness as it is about agreeing on a particular set of demands. Life is a mystery, as one pop star fashionista has insisted, and Occupiers wanted to keep it that way. Likewise, general strikes were imagined as ways in which workers could take back time—regain those parts of life that had become routinized by work. Rather than attempts to achieve large-scale reforms, general strikes were improvisations, escapes from the daily calculations of production that demonstrated that we can still be happy, creative, even productive individuals without jobs. As one unfurled banner along New York’s Broadway read during this spring’s May Day protests, “Why work? Be happy.”

In many ways, the Occupy movement was a rebellion against the institutionalized nature of twenty-first century capitalism and democracy. Equally skeptical of corporate monopolies as it was of the technocratic tendencies of the state, it was ultimately an insurgency against control, against the ways in which organized power and capital deprived the individual of the time and space needed to control his or her life. Just as the vertically inclined leftists of the twentieth century leveraged the public corporation—the welfare state—against the increasingly powerful number of private ones, so too were Occupy and, more generally, the horizontalist Left to embrace the age of the market: at the center of their politics was the anthropological “man” in both his forms—*homo faber* and *homo ludens*—who was capable of negotiating his interests outside the state. For this reason, the movement did not fit neatly into right or left, conservative or liberal, revolutionary or reformist categories. On the one hand, it was sympathetic to the most classic of left aspirations: to dismantle governing hierarchies. On the other, its language was imbued with a strident individualism: a politics of anti-institutionalism and personal freedom that has most often been affiliated with the Right.

Seeking an alternative to the bureaucratic tendencies of capitalism and socialism, Occupiers were to frequently invoke the image of autonomy: of a world in which social and economic relations exist outside the institutions of the state. **Their aspiration was a society based on organic, decentralized circuits of exchange and deliberation—on voluntary associations, on local debate**, on loose networks of affinity groups.

If political and economic life had become abstracted in the age of globalization and financialization, then Occupy activists wanted to re-politicize our everyday choices. As David Graeber, one of Occupy’s chief theoretical architects, explained two days after Zuccotti Park was occupied, “The idea is essentially that “the system is not going to save us,” so “we’re going to have to save ourselves.”

Borrowing from the anarchist tradition, Graeber has called this work “direct action”: the practice of circumventing, even on occasion subverting, hierarchies through practical projects. Instead of attempting “to pressure the government to institute reforms” or “seize state power,” direct actions seek to “build a new society in the shell of the old.” By creating spaces in which individuals take control over their lives, it is a strategy of acting and thinking “as if one is already free.” Marina Sitrin, another prominent Occupier, has offered another name for this politics—“horizontalism”: “the use of direct democracy, the striving for consensus” and “processes in which everyone is heard and new relationships are created.” It is a politics that not only refuses institutionalization but also imagines a new subjectivity from which one can project the future into the present.

Direct action and horizontal democracy are new names, of course, for old ideas. They descend—most directly—from the ideas and tactics of the global justice movement of the 1990s and 2000s. Direct Action Network was founded in 1999 to help coordinate the anti-WTO protests in Seattle; *horizontalidad*, as it was called in Argentina, emerged as a way for often unemployed workers to organize during the financial crisis of 2001. Both emerged out of the theories and practices of a movement that was learning as it went along. The ad hoc working groups, the all-night bull sessions, the daylong actions, the decentralized planning were all as much by necessity as they were by design. They were not necessarily intended at first. But what emerged out of anti-globalization was a new vision of globalization. Local and horizontal in practice, direct action and democracy were to become catchphrases for a movement that was attempting to resist the often autocratic tendencies of a fast-globalizing capitalism.

But direct action and horizontal democracy also tap into a longer, if often neglected, tradition on the left: the anarchism, syndicalism, and autonomist Marxism that stretch from Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Rosa Luxemburg to C.L.R. James, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Antonio Negri. If revolutionary socialism was a theory about ideal possibilities, then anarchism and autonomism often focused on the revolutionary practices themselves. The way in which the revolution was organized was the primary act of revolution. Autonomy, as the Greco-French Castoriadis told *Le Monde* in 1977, demands not only “the elimination of dominant groups and of the institutions embodying and orchestrating that domination” but also new modes of what he calls “self-management and organization.”

With direct action and horizontal democracy, the Occupy movement not only developed a set of new tactics but also a governing ideology, a theory of time and space that runs counter to many of the practices of earlier leftist movements. Unlike revolutionary socialism or evolutionary social democracy—Marx’s Esau and Jacob—Occupiers conceived of time as more cyclical than developmental, its understanding of space more local and horizontal than structural and vertical. The revolution was to come but only through everyday acts. It was to occur only through—what Castoriadis obliquely referred to as—“the self-institution of society.”

The seemingly spontaneous movement that emerged after the first general assemblies in Zuccotti Park was not, then, sui generis but an elaboration of a much larger turn by the Left. As occupations spread across the country and as activists begin to exchange organizational tactics, it was easy to forget that what was happening was, in fact, a part of a much larger shift in the scale and plane of Western politics: a turn toward more local and horizontal patterns of life, a growing skepticism toward the institutions of the state, and an increasing desire to seek out greater realms of personal freedom. And although its hibernation over the summer has, perhaps, marked the end of the Occupy movement, OWS has also come to represent an important—and perhaps more lasting—break. In both its ideas and tactics, it has given us a new set of desires—autonomy, radical democracy, direct action—that look well beyond the ideological and tactical tropes of socialism. Its occupations and general assemblies, its flash mobs and street performances, its loose network of activists all suggest a bold new set of possibilities for the Left: a horizontalist ethos that believes that revolution will begin by transforming our everyday lives.

It can be argued that horizontalism is, in many ways, a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that **it is a kind of free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the very culture it hopes to resist.** For not only does it emphasize the agency of the individual, but it draws one of its central inspirations from a neoclassical image: that of the self-managing society—the polity that functions best when the state is absent from everyday decisions.

But one can also find in its anti-institutionalism an attempt to speak in today’s language for yesterday’s goals. If we must live in a society that neither trusts nor feels compelled by collectivist visions, then horizontalism offers us a leftism that attempts to be, at once, both individualist and egalitarian, anti-institutional and democratic, open to the possibilities of self-management and yet also concerned with the casualties born out of an age that has let capital manage itself for far too long. Horizontalism has absorbed the crisis of knowledge—what we often call “postmodernism”—and the crisis of collectivism—what we often call “neoliberalism.” But instead of seeking to return to some golden age before our current moment of fracture, it seeks—for better and worse—to find a way to make leftist politics conform to our current age of anti-foundationalism and institutionalism. As Graeber argued in the prescriptive last pages of his anthropological epic, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*, “Capitalism has transformed the world in many ways that are clearly irreversible” and we therefore need to give up “the false choice between state and market that [has] so monopolized political ideology for the last centuries that it made it difficult to argue about anything else.” We need, in other words, to stop thinking like leftists.

But herein lies the problem. Not all possible forms of human existence and social interaction, no matter how removed they are from the institutions of power and capital, are good forms of social organization. Although it is easy to look enthusiastically to those societies—ancient or modern, Western or non-Western—that exist beyond the structures of the state, they, too, have their own patterns of hierarchy, their own embittered lines of inequality and injustice. More important, to select one form of social organization over the other is **always an act of exclusion**. Instituting and then protecting a particular way of life will always require a normative commitment in which not every value system is respected—in which, in other words, there is a moral hierarchy.

More problematically, by working outside structures of power one may circumvent coercive systems but one does **not necessarily subvert them**. Localizing politics—stripping it of its larger institutional ambitions—has, to be sure, its advantages. But without a larger structural vision, it does not go far enough. “Bubbles of freedom,” as Graeber calls them, may create a larger variety of non-institutional life. But they will always neglect other crucial avenues of freedom: in particular, those social and economic rights that can only be protected from the top down. In this way, the anti-institutionalism of horizontalism comes dangerously close to that of the libertarian Right. The turn to previous eras of social organization, the desire to locate and confine politics to a particular regional space, the deep skepticism toward all forms of institutional life not only mirror the aspirations of libertarianism but help cloak those hierarchies spawned from non-institutional forms of power and capital.

This is a particularly pointed irony for a political ideology that claims to be opposed to the many injustices of a non-institutional market—in particular, its unregulated financial schemes. Perhaps this is an irony deeply woven into the theoretical quilt of autonomy: a vision that, as a result of its anti-institutionalism, is drawn to all sites of individual liberation—even those that are to be found in the marketplace. As Graeber concludes in *Debt*, “Markets, when allowed to drift entirely free from their violent origins, invariably begin to grow into something different, into networks of honor, trust, and mutual connectedness,” whereas “the maintenance of systems of coercion constantly do the opposite: turn the products of human cooperation, creativity, devotion, love and trust back into numbers once again.”

In many ways, this is the result of a set of political ideas that have lost touch with their origins. The desire for autonomy was born out of the socialist—if not also often the Marxist—tradition and there was always a guarded sympathy for the structures needed to oppose organized systems of capital and power. Large-scale institutions were, for thinkers such as Castoriadis, Negri, and C.L.R. James, still essential if every cook was truly to govern. To only “try to create ‘spaces of freedom’ ‘alongside’ of the State” meant, as Castoriadis was to argue later in his life, to back “down from the problem of politics.” In fact, this was, he believed, the failure of 1968: “the inability to set up new, different institutions” and recognize that “there is no such thing as a society without institutions.”

This is—and will be—a problem for the horizontalist Left as it moves forward. As a leftism ready-made for an age in which all sides of the political spectrum are arrayed against the regulatory state, it is always in danger of becoming absorbed into the very ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle. For it aspires to a decentralized and organic politics that, in both principle and practice, shares a lot in common with its central target. Both it and the “free market” are anti-institutional. And the latter will remain so without larger vertical measures. Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed. The revolution cannot happen only on the ground; it must also happen from above. A direct democracy still needs its indirect structures, individual freedoms still need to be measured by their collective consequences, and notions of social and economic equality still need to stand next to the desire for greater political participation. Deregulation is another regulatory regime, and to replace it requires new regulations: institutions that will limit the excesses of the market. As Castoriadis insisted in the years after 1968, the Left’s task is not only to abolish old institutions but to discover “new kinds of relationship between society and its institutions.”

Horizontalism has come to serve as an important break from the static strategies and categories of analysis that have slowed an aging and vertically inclined Left. OWS was to represent its fullest expression yet, though it has a much longer back story and still—one hopes—a promising future. But horizontalists such as Graeber and Sitrin will struggle to establish spaces of freedom if they cannot formulate a larger vision for a society. Their vision is not—as several on the vertical left have suggested—too utopian but not utopian enough: in seeking out local spaces of freedom, they have confined their ambitions; they have, in fact, come, at times, to mirror the very ideology they hope to resist. In his famous retelling of the turtle parable, Clifford Geertz warned that in “the search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,” we have to be careful to not “lose touch with the hard surfaces of life—with the political, economic, stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere contained.” This is an ever-present temptation, and one that, in our age of ever more stratification, we must resist.

### 2NC A2 Perm: BwB NB

#### The plan and perm’s bankrupt foundationing of politics along the binary poles of blackness and whiteness is a disad to the perm and net benefit to the alt. Only our method can address non-color coded inequality—here are 4 independent DA’s to their starting point:

Cole, 9 [Mike Cole, Professor, Bishop Grossette University, Emeritus Research Professor in Education and Equality, “On 'white supremacy and caricaturing, misrepresenting and dismissing Marx and Marxism: a response to David Gillborn's "Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory in Education"'.”, Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies 7 no1 29-49 Je 2009, accessed via Wayne State, online, jj]

In Cole, 2009a (see also Cole, 2009b), I argued that there are four significant problems with the term 'white supremacy'. The first is that it can direct critical attention away from modes of production. To take one example, it is difficult to understand racism in the immediate post-world war period in the UK without addressing the needs of the post-war economy and the need for cheap labour from the (former) colonies. This, in turn, has to be seen in the context of British Imperialism.

The second problem with 'white supremacy' is that it homogenizes all white people together as being in positions of power and privilege. Thus it masks, for example, the vast number of poor white people in the UK. While black people are twice as poor as whites, and those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin over three times as poor as whites (Platt, 2007), this still leaves some 12 million poor white people in the UK.

Third, 'white supremacy' inadequately explains what I have referred to as 'non-colour-coded racism'. Gillborn (2009, p. 128), notes that I insist on reading 'White supremacy in simple blanket terms as if CRT viewed all Whites as equally privileged and equally powerful', and that I do not deal with his statement in his (2008) book that 'All White-identified people are implicated in these relations but they are not all active in identical ways and they do not all draw similar benefits -- but they do all benefit, whether they like it or not' (Gillborn 2008, p. 34). I do, in fact deal with this in detail in Cole, 2009b (pp. 61-64), where I argue, in a CRT-type 'chronicle'(FN2), that this is not necessarily the case for all white people. Suffice it to point out here that the existence of anti-semitism (e.g. Townsend, 2009), anti-Irish racism (e.g. Mac An Ghaill, 2000), anti-Gypsy Roma Traveller (GRT) racism (e.g. Duffy and Tomlinson, 2009), xeno-racism (e.g. Fekete, 2009) and Islamophobia (since this is not necessarily based on skin colour) all challenge the concept of 'white supremacy' and militate against notions of 'all white-identified people benefit', at least as a universal declaration(FN3). Lack of 'white benefit' is particularly acute at given periods of history in certain geographical locations. Current anti-GRT racism in predominantly 'white' areas of the UK is but one example.

The fourth problem with 'white supremacy' is that it is totally counterproductive as a political unifier and rallying point against racism. Telling working class white people that they are 'white supremacist', for Marxists, totally undermines the unification of the working class which is necessary to challenge capitalism and imperialism. This is developed below(FN4).

# 1NR

### Resistance Bad Link EXT

#### Their assumption of ontological blackness essentializes blackness as a racial category subservient to whiteness

Welcome, 4– completing his PhD at the sociology department of the City University of New York's Graduate Center (H. Alexander, "White Is Right": The Utilization of an Improper Ontological Perspective in Analyses of Black Experiences, Journal of African American Studies, Summer-Fall 2004, Vol. 8, No. 1 & 2, pp. 59-73)

**In many of the studies of blacks, the experiences of whites, not blacks, are used as the backing for the construction of the warrants/rules that are employed to evaluate black experiences**, delimiting the "concepts and relationships that can exist" in the black community. **The life histories of whites are used as the standard against which black experiences are measured and as the goals to which blacks are encouraged to strive. The employment of this ontology fallaciously limits the range of black agency, producing deceitful narratives where the navigation of the social environment by blacks is dictated by either a passive response to, or a passive adoption of, white scripts.** This ontology erroneously limits descriptions and evaluations of black experiences, excluding viable causal determinants of the socio-economic status of blacks and constructing restricted descriptions of black agency. **The utilization of whiteness to determine and/or evaluate blackness begins when whiteness and white life histories come to represent what is "right."** "White is right" is a sarcastic phrase that was an extremely popular slur during the Black Power movement in the mid-1960s to the early 1970s; the utilization of this phrase represents a form of social critique that takes exception to both the privileging of white biographies as accurate descriptions of history and the reconstitution of these histories as a template that blacks and other people of color should follow for navigating social environments and achieving positive social mobility. Part of the prominence of the "white is right" perspective comes from the numerical superiority of whites. As a group, whites have been in the majority throughout the history of the United States and the prominence of the white experience has been used to argue that white experiences should be used as a social template. It has been used as such in the works of Robert Park (1939) and Gunnar Myrdal (1944), both of whom suggested that by copying the patterns of whites, blacks would achieve positive social mobility. However, use of the numerical superiority of whites to support claims about the "rightness" of white experiences relies on the equation of quantitative dominance with qualitative dominance and the employment of the fallacious argumentum ad populum. **The actual source of the dominance of the "white is right" perspective lies in the dynamics of power. The location of the origins of the dominant ideology in power relations is conceptualized in the work of Michel Foucault (1980), who theorized that power is imbricated with discourse:** We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (p. 101). **Key to the deployment of discourses is an underlying strategy. As such, the prominence of the "white is right" perspective can be traced to attempts to create an "order,"** or a way of thinking. Foucault's theoretical lens supports the hypothesis that the **privileging of white experiences and the use of these experiences as an ontological framework for the analyses of black experiences is an effect of power imbalances.**

#### Affirming racial identity is violent

Enns 7 (Diane, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy and Peace Studies, McMaster University, “Political Life Before Identity”, Theory & Event 10:1, Project Muse)

In his formidable analysis of the Rwandan genocide, Mahmood Mamdani concludes that political identities are artifacts. This does not mean there are not real victims or real perpetrators, but that continuing to act in the name of an identity once an economy of violence has sprung out of the binary logic of victim and perpetrator, or friend and enemy, **does not enable political transformation, but prevents it**. The great crime of colonialism, from this perspective, went beyond the expropriation of the native; "the greater crime was to politicize indigeneity in the first place."6 Mamdani includes in this politicization both the negative libeling of the native by the settler, as well as the positive self-assertion of the native response to this libel, a perspective remarkably similar, as we shall see, to Fanon's position in Black Skin White Masks. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda -- unprecedented for its massive civilian participation in the massacre of the Tutsi population -- occurred in the context of a political world set in motion by Belgian colonialism: a world divided into natives and settlers. **The genocide was a natives' genocide**, Mamdani argues, a struggle by the majority, the Hutu, to cleanse the country of a threatening "alien" presence, the minority Tutsi, a group with a privileged relation to power before colonialism. This was a violence not of neighbors against neighbors then, as it is generally portrayed, he contends, but against a population viewed as a foreigner; a violence therefore that sought to eliminate a foreign presence from home soil. Rather than focusing on the origin of a racial or ethnic difference, the crucial task, according to Mamdani, is to ask when and how Hutu was made into a native identity and Tutsi into a settler identity, and to understand how violence is the key to sustaining the relationship between them.7 **It is not merely the settler's or perpetrator's worldview we need to break out of, but that of the victim as well, for they stand or fall together.**

***Whether identity in the abstract is good or bad is not relevant---it’s about understanding the ways in which the specific identities of the affirmative are deployed politically***

Wendy **Brown**, Professor of Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, 19**93**

(“Wounded Attachments.” Political Theory Vol. 21 No. 3. August. P.391)

I approach these questions by sketching, first, the discursive context of identity politics' emergence in the United States, and then elaborating, through reconsideration of Nietzsche's genealogy of the logics of ressenti- ment, the wounded character of politicized identity's desire within this context. **What this essay is not is a partisan position in the argument about the virtues and vices of a contemporary political formation called "identity politics**," an argument sufficiently stalemated to suggest the limitations of discussing identity either in terms of the (implicitly timeless) metaphysical or linguistic elements of its constitution or in the moral terms of good and evil. **It is, rather, an exploration of the ways in which certain troubling aspects of the specific genealogy of politicized identity are carried in its political demands, ways in which certain emancipatory aims of politicized identity are subverted not only by the constraints of the political discourses in which its operations transpire but by its own wounded attachments.**

### \*\*2NC/1NR Revenge Link

***The claim that oppression should be the basis for winning a debate round is a pretty good example of our link argument---the ballot is not a tool of emancipation, but rather a tool of revenge---it serves as a palliative that denies their investment in oppression as a means by which to claim the power of victory***

**Enns 12**—Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University (Dianne, The Violence of Victimhood, 28-30)

Guilt and Ressentiment We need to think carefully about what is at stake here. Why is this perspective appealing, and what are its effects? At first glance, the argument appears simple: white, privileged women, in their theoretical and practical interventions, must take into account the experiences and conceptual work of women who are less fortunate and less powerful, have fewer resources, and are therefore more subject to systemic oppression. The lesson of feminism's mistakes in the civil rights era is that this “mainstream” group must not speak for other women. But such a view must be interrogated. Its effects, as I have argued, include a veneration of the other, moral currency for the victim, and an insidious competition for victimhood. We will see in later chapters that these effects are also common in situations of conflict where the stakes are much higher. ¶ We witness here a twofold appeal: **otherness discourse** in feminism **appeals both to the guilt of the privileged and to the** **resentment**, or ressentiment, **of the other**. Suleri's allusion to “embarrassed privilege” exposes the operation of guilt in the misunderstanding that often divides Western feminists from women in the developing world, or white women from women of color. **The guilt of those who feel themselves deeply implicated in** and responsible for **imperialism** ***merely reinforces an imperialist benevolence***, ***polarizes us unambiguously by locking us into the categories of victim and perpetrator***, ***and blinds us to the power and agency of the other.*** **Many fail to see that it is embarrassing and insulting for those identified as** **victimized others not to be subjected to the same critical intervention** **and held to the same demands of moral and political responsibility**. **Though we are** **by no means equal in power and ability**, **wealth and advantage,** **we are all collectively responsible for the world** **we inhabit in common**. The condition of victimhood does not absolve one of moral responsibility. I will return to this point repeatedly throughout this book.¶ **Mohanty**'s perspective **ignores the possibility that *one can become attached to one's subordinated status*, which introduces** the concept of **ressentiment**, the focus of much recent interest in the injury caused by racism and colonization. Nietzsche describes ressentiment as the overwhelming sentiment of “slave morality,” the revolt that begins when **ressentiment** **itself becomes creative and gives birth to values**. 19 **The sufferer** in this schema **seeks out a** **cause** for his suffering—“ a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering”— someone **on whom he can vent his affects and so procure the anesthesia** necessary **to ease** **the pain of injury**. The motivation behind ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, is the desire “to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.” 20 In its contemporary manifestation, Wendy Brown argues that **ressentiment acts as the “*righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured***,” which “delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the ‘injury’ of social subordination.” ***Identities are fixed in an economy of perpetrator and victim, in which revenge, rather than power or emancipation, is sought*** for the injured, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer does. 21¶ 30¶ Such a concept is useful for understanding why an ethics of absolute responsibility to the other appeals to the victimized. Brown remarks that, for Nietzsche, the source of **the triumph of a morality rooted in ressentiment is the *denial that it has any access to power or contains a will to power***. **Politicized** **identities arise as** both **product of and reaction to this condition**; ***the reaction is a substitute for action***— an “imaginary revenge,” Nietzsche calls it. **Suffering** then **becomes a social virtue** at the same time **that the sufferer attempts to displace his suffering onto another**. **The identity** created by ressentiment, Brown explains, **becomes invested in its own subjection** **not only through its discovery of someone to blame,** and a new recognition and revaluation of that subjection, **but also through the *satisfaction of revenge***. 22¶ The outcome of feminism's attraction to theories of difference and otherness is thus deeply contentious. First, **we witness the further reification** reification **of the very oppositions in question and a simple reversal of the focus from the same to the other.** This observation is not new and has been made by many critics of feminism, but it seems to have made no serious impact on mainstream feminist scholarship or teaching practices in women's studies programs. Second, in the eagerness to rectify the mistakes of “white, middle-class, liberal, western” feminism, **the other has been uncritically exalted**, **which has led** in turn **to** simplistic designations of marginal, “othered” status and, ultimately, **a competition for victimhood**. Ultimately, this approach has led to a new moral code in which ethics is equated with the responsibility of the privileged Western woman, while moral immunity is granted to the victimized other. Ranjana Khanna describes this operation aptly when she writes that in the field of transnational feminism, **the reification of the other has produced** “***separate ethical universes***” ***in which the privileged experience paralyzing guilt and the neocolonized, crippling resentment***. **The only “overarching imperative” is that one does not comment on another's ethical context.** ***An ethical response turns out to be a nonresponse***. 23 Let us turn now to an exploration of this third outcome.

### Yancy

#### Universalism has and must be redeployed in non-Eurocentric contexts --- their insistence on epistemological inclusivity turns all their offense

Zizek ‘02

Žižek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Science (University of Ljubljana), 2002 [Slavoj, inteview with Bad Subjects, “I am a Fighting Atheist: Interview with Slavoj Žižek,” Bad Subjects, Issue #59, February, <http://eserver.org/bs/59/zizek.html>]

BS: Several times you've used the word "universalism." For trafficking in such concepts, people you'd identify as forces of political correctness have indicted you for Eurocentrism. You've even written a radical leftist plea for Eurocentrism. How do you respond to the PC camp's charges against you? Zizek: I think that we should accept that universalism is a Eurocentrist notion. This may sound racist, but I don't think it is. Even when Third World countries appeal to freedom and democracy, when they formulate their struggle against European imperialism, they are at a more radical level endorsing the European premise of universalism. You may remember that in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the ANC always appealed to universal Enlightenment values, and it was Buthelezi, the regime's black supporter in the pay of the CIA, who appealed to special African values. My opponent here is the widely accepted position that we should leave behind the quest for universal truth — that what we have instead are just different narratives about who we are, the stories we tell about ourselves. So, in that view, the highest ethical injunction is to respect the other story. All the stories should be told, each ethnic, political, or sexual group should be given the right to tell its story, as if this kind of tolerance towards the plurality of stories with no universal truth value is the ultimate ethical horizon. I oppose this radically. This ethics of storytelling is usually accompanied by a right to narrate, as if the highest act you can do today is to narrate your own story, as if only a black lesbian mother can know what it's like to be a black lesbian mother, and so on. Now this may sound very emancipatory. But the moment we accept this logic, we enter a kind of apartheid. In a situation of social domination, all narratives are not the same. For example, in Germany in the 1930s, the narrative of the Jews wasn't just one among many. This was the narrative that explained the truth about the entire situation. Or today, take the gay struggle. It's not enough for gays to say, "we want our story to be heard." No, the gay narrative must contain a universal dimension, in the sense that their implicit claim must be that what happens to us is not something that concerns only us. What is happening to us is a symptom or signal that tells us something about what's wrong with the entirety of society today. We have to insist on this universal dimension.

#### The alt is not a view from nowhere but rather an attempt to locate truth as the Singular Universal—it’s the 3rd way between neutral objective knowledge and the aff’s vacuous particular relativism

Zizek, 8 [Dr. Slavoj Zizek, (Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana, Slovenia), Volume 5, Number 1 (January, 2008). The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, <http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol5_1/v5-1-article3-zizek.html>, jj]

This, then, is what gets lost in Singer's geistige Tierreich: the Thing, something to which we are unconditionally attached irrespective of its positive qualities. In Singer's universe, there is a place for mad cows, but no place for an Indian sacred cow. In other words, what gets lost here is simply the dimen­sion of truth – not "objective truth" as the notion of reality from a point of view which somehow floats above the multitude of particular narratives, but truth as the Singular Universal. When Lenin says "The theory of Marx is all ­powerful, because it is true," everything depends on how we understand "truth" here: is it a neutral "objective knowledge," or the truth of an engaged subject? Lenin's wager – today, in our era of postmodern relativism, more actual than ever – is that universal truth and partisanship, the gesture of tak­ing sides, are not only not mutually exclusive, but condition each other: in a concrete situation, its universal truth can only be articulated from a thor­oughly partisan position – truth is by definition one-sided. This, of course, goes against the predominant doxa of compromise, of finding a middle path among the multitude of conflicting interests. If one does not specify the crite­ria of the different, alternate narrativization, then this endeavor courts the danger of endorsing, in the Politically Correct mood, ridiculous "narratives" like those about the supremacy of some aboriginal holistic wisdom, of dis­missing science as just another narrative on a par with premodern supersti­tions.

#### There’s no such thing as a view from nowhere; our approach means constantly traveling and shifting our “view from somewhere”

Latour ‘5 (Bruno, Prof. @ Sciences Po and director of the TARDE program (Theory of Actor-network and Research in Digital Environments), *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory,* pp. 145-146)

S: That’s just what I was going to say! There are not only objective realities, but also subjective ones! This is why we need both types of social theories . . .

P: See? That’s the inevitable trap: ‘Not only . . . but also’. Either you extend the argument to everything, but then it becomes useless— ‘interpretation’ becomes another synonym for ‘objectivity’—or else you limit it to one aspect of reality, the human, and then you are stuck—since objectivity is always on the other side of the fence. And it makes no difference if the other side is considered richer or poorer; it’s out of reach anyway.

S: But you wouldn’t deny that you also possess a standpoint, that ANT is situated as well, that you also add another layer of interpretation, a perspective?

P: No, why would I ‘deny’ it? But so what? The great thing about a standpoint is that you can stand on it and modify it! Why would I be ‘stuck with’ it? From where they are on earth, astronomers have a limited perspective. Take for instance Greenwich, the Observatory down the river from here. Have you been there? It’s a beautiful place. And yet, they have been pretty good at shifting this perspective, through instruments, telescopes, satellites. They can now draw a map of the distribution of galaxies in the whole universe. Pretty good, no? Show me one standpoint and I will show you two dozen ways to shift out of it. Listen: all this opposition between ‘standpoint’ and ‘view from nowhere’, you can safely forget. And also this difference between ‘interpretative’ and ‘objectivist’. Leave hermeneutics aside and go back to the object—or rather, to the thing.

S: But I am always limited to my situated viewpoint, to my perspective, to my own subjectivity?

P: Of course you are! But what makes you think that ‘having a viewpoint’ means ‘being limited’ or especially ‘subjective’? When you travel abroad and you follow the sign ‘Belvedere 1.5 km’, ‘Panorama’, ‘Bella vista’, when you finally reach the breath-taking site, in what way is this proof of your ‘subjective limits’? It’s the thing itself, the valley, the peaks, the roads, that offer you this grasp, this handle, this take. The best proof is that, two meters lower, you see nothing because of the trees and two meters higher, you see nothing because of a parking lot. And yet you have the same limited ‘subjectivity’ and you transport with you exactly the very same ‘standpoint’! If you can have many points of views on a statue, it’s because the statue itself is in three-dimensions and allows you, yes, allows you to move around it. If something supports many viewpoints, it’s just that it’s highly complex, intricately folded, nicely organized, and beautiful, yes, objectively beautiful.

S: But certainly nothing is objectively beautiful—beauty has to be subjective . . . taste and color, relative . . . I am lost again. Why would we spend so much time in this school fighting objectivism then? What you say can’t be right.

P: Because the things people call ‘objective’ are most of the time the clichés of matters of facts. We don’t have a very good description of anything: of what a computer, a piece of software, a formal system, a theorem, a company, a market is. We know next to nothing of what this thing you’re studying, an organization, is. How would we be able to distinguish it from human emotions? So, there are two ways to criticize objectivity: one is by going away from the object to the subjective human viewpoint. But the other direction is the one I am talking about: back to the object. Positivists don’t own objectivity. A computer described by Alan Turing is quite a bit richer and more interesting than the ones described by Wired magazine, no? As we saw in class yesterday, a soap factory described by Richard Powers in Gain is much livelier than what you read in Harvard case studies. The name of the game is to get back to empiricism.

S: Still, I am limited to my own view.

P: Of course you are, but again, so what? Don’t believe all that crap about being ‘limited’ to one’s perspective. All of the sciences have been inventing ways to move from one standpoint to the next, from one frame of reference to the next, for God’s sake: that’s called relativity.